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The Cost of Doing Business?
Corporate Registration as Valid
Consent to General Personal
Jurisdiction
Matthew D. Kaminer*
Abstract
Every state has a statute that requires out-of-state
corporations to register with a designated official before doing
business there, but courts disagree on what impact, if any, those
statutes can or should have on personal jurisdiction doctrine. A
minority of states interpret compliance with their registration
statutes as the company’s consent to general personal
jurisdiction, meaning it can be sued on any cause of action there,
even those unrelated to the company’s conduct in that state. The
United States Supreme Court upheld this “consent by
registration” theory over 100 years ago, but since then has
manifested a sea change in personal jurisdiction jurisprudence
that leaves its continued viability in limbo. Two decisions by the
Court from the 2010s—Goodyear Dunlop Tire Operations, S.A.
v. Brown and Daimler AG v. Bauman—drastically contracted
the scope of contacts-based general jurisdiction but did not
appear to address the contours of consent jurisdiction. The
palpable discord makes it high time for the issue to reach the
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to Maddie and my family—your love, support, and belief in me throughout law
school and life make me proud to see my name in print.
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Supreme Court, as it has in the high courts of four states in 2021
alone.
So, the question remains: what is left of consent by
registration? Many courts and scholars have rejected the theory,
reasoning that a corporation cannot give valid, knowing consent
to general jurisdiction by simply complying with a state business
registration statute. This Note sets out to address these concerns;
it suggests that, under certain legal frameworks—where either
explicit statutory language or controlling decisional law makes
clear to corporations the jurisdictional consequences of
registration—corporations can indeed give valid, informed
consent to general jurisdiction by registering to do business in
the state.
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I. INTRODUCTION
“Even when the seatbelt sign is turned off, please keep your
seatbelt fastened in case of turbulence.”
If you have ever flown on an airplane, you likely have heard
this phrase announced by a flight attendant over a loudspeaker
before. But sometimes, duty calls. Amina Diab, a Pennsylvania
resident, was a passenger on a British Airways flight from New
York to London in August 2018.1 After the flight reached
cruising altitude and attendants turned off the seatbelt sign,
Diab got up from her seat, walked down the aisle, and entered
the restroom.2 Suddenly, turbulence ensued and Diab was
“violently thrown” throughout the restroom, injuring her leg.3
When she returned to the United States, she was diagnosed with
a lateral patellar dislocation and a sprained knee.4
Looking to file suit against British Airways for her injuries,
Diab was in an odd position. Determining which state’s courts
would have personal jurisdiction over the defendant is,
especially in aviation cases, “a daunting task.”5 Because the
plane was at cruising altitude when Diab was injured, it was not
clear where exactly the harm occurred, so the issue of specific
personal jurisdiction over British Airways would likely be hotly
contested in any state’s courts, leading to extensive
jurisdictional discovery and expenses for the plaintiff.6

1. See Diab v. British Airways, PLC, No. 20-3744, 2020 WL 6870607, at
*1 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 23, 2020).
2. See id. (“[A]fter the seat belt sign was turned off, Diab walked down
the aisle and entered the lavatory . . . .”) (internal quotations omitted).
3. See id. (“[W]ithout warning, [Ms. Diab] was violently thrown about
the lavatory causing her to rotate forcefully about her right knee causing Ms.
Diab to suffer immediate pain to her right knee.”).
4. Id.
5. See Don Swaim et al., After the Crash, Where Do You Land, 80 J. AIR
L. & COM. 521, 524 (2015).
6. See id. at 533 (“Plaintiff’s counsel should be mindful of a company’s
activities, advertisements, sales, and distribution practices in the chosen
forum, and should be prepared to engage in jurisdictional discovery to
determine if a defendant has undertaken sufficient activities to target the
forum state.”).
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So Diab, like many individuals harmed by the conduct of
large corporations,7 wanted to sue British Airways in her home
state: Pennsylvania. However, to bring the lawsuit there, a
Pennsylvania state or federal court would need to properly
exercise personal jurisdiction over British Airways.8 Specific
personal jurisdiction over British Airways in Pennsylvania
seemed improbable, as the incident itself was not related to
Pennsylvania, other than that the plaintiff lived there.9 British
Airways is an English corporation with its principal place of
business in London, so general personal jurisdiction in any
forum in the United States—let alone Pennsylvania—would
also be unavailable.10 Or would it?
Turns out, British Airways is actually registered to do
business in Pennsylvania. Better yet, Pennsylvania has a
unique law that requires any corporation seeking to register to
do business in the Commonwealth to also consent to general
personal jurisdiction there—meaning the corporation agrees to
be sued in Pennsylvania courts on any cause of action, whether
or not related to activities occurring in Pennsylvania.11 Under

7. See Nicholas D. Welly, The Misleading Legacy of Tseng: Removal
Jurisdiction Under the Montreal Convention, 75 J. AIR L. & COM. 407, 413
(2010) (“[I]t is commonly recognized that trial courts in a plaintiff’s home state
provide the plaintiff with the most sympathetic recourse for justice.”); see also
Alexandra Wilson Albright, Personal Jurisdiction, 30 APP. ADVOC. 9, 9 (2017)
(“A client’s first question to her lawyer is often about forum choice: ‘Can I sue
at home?’ To answer that question, the lawyer must first consider whether the
defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction in the state where the plaintiff
seeks to file suit.”).
8. See Burnham v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 609 (1990) (“[T]he
judgment of a court lacking personal jurisdiction violate[s] the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as well.”) (citing Pennoyer v. Neff, 95
U.S. 714, 732 (1878)).
9. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915,
919 (2011) (“In contrast to general, all-purpose jurisdiction, specific
jurisdiction is confined to adjudication of ‘issues deriving from, or connected
with, the very controversy that establishes jurisdiction.’”) (quoting Arthur T.
von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested
Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1136 (1966)).
10. See Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017,
1034 (2021) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“A tribunal with ‘general jurisdiction’
may entertain any claim against the defendant. But to trigger this power, a
court usually must ensure the defendant is ‘at home’ in the forum State.”)
(quoting Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137 (2014)).
11. See 42 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5301(a) (West 2020).
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this statute, Diab could sue British Airways in Pennsylvania
without having to demonstrate minimum contacts with
Pennsylvania because British Airways consented to being sued
there as a prerequisite to its state business registration.
Pennsylvania gets to provide a forum for one of its injured
residents, Diab gets to bring her lawsuit without fear of
litigating overseas or in another foreign jurisdiction, and British
Airways stands by the agreement it made with the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
Diab did ultimately pursue her claim in a Pennsylvania
federal court under the Montreal Convention, which allows for
people injured during international air travel to recover for their
injuries.12 But British Airways moved to dismiss the complaint
for lack of personal jurisdiction, arguing that the exercise of
general jurisdiction over the airline in Pennsylvania would be
unconstitutional because it did not agree to be sued there and
was not “at home” there, as the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment would otherwise require.13 The
objection is understandable; despite being registered to do
business in Pennsylvania, British Airways was clearly not at
home there, at least as the United States Supreme Court has
understood the phrase in the context of general jurisdiction.14
But does that matter?15 Under the Pennsylvania statutory
scheme, British Airways seemingly waived the minimum
contacts protections of the Due Process Clause when it
consented to general jurisdiction by registering to do business in
Pennsylvania.16 What should the court do? What is it allowed to
do?
These questions have been the subject of fundamental
disagreement among dozens of state and federal courts across

12. See Diab v. British Airways, PLC, No. 20-3744, 2020 WL 6870607, at
*2 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 23, 2020).
13. See id. at *1.
14. See infra note 128 and accompanying text.
15. See Diab, 2020 WL 6870607 at *3 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 23, 2020) (“But a full
analysis of where British Airways is at home in the United States is
unnecessary here.”).
16. See id. at *6 (“British Airways registered to do business in
Pennsylvania knowing that doing so subjected it to general personal
jurisdiction in Pennsylvania.”).
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the country, particularly in the past decade.17 Every state has a
statute that requires corporations to register with the state
before doing business there,18 but courts disagree on what
impact, if any, those statutes can or should have on personal
jurisdiction doctrine. That divide only deepened after the
Supreme Court drastically narrowed the scope of general
jurisdiction in Goodyear Dunlop Tires v. Brown19 and Daimler
AG v. Bauman.20 Through those decisions, the Court collectively
held that Due Process permits the exercise of contacts-based
general jurisdiction only where the defendant can fairly be
regarded as “at home.”21 Prior to Goodyear, plaintiffs did not
often need to resort to consent by registration because
contacts-based general jurisdiction was construed more
broadly.22 Following Goodyear and Daimler, however, plaintiffs
resuscitated consent theories in an effort to adapt,
arguing— when litigating in the courts of certain states with
plaintiff-friendly statutory schemes—that defendants had
consented to general jurisdiction by registering to do business
there.23 Under this theory, plaintiffs would argue, Due Process
17. See, e.g., cases cited infra note 41.
18. See infra note 151 and accompanying text.
19. 564 U.S. 915 (2011).
20. 571 U.S. 117 (2014).
21. See id. at 138–39 (“[T]he inquiry under Goodyear is not whether a
foreign corporation’s in-forum contacts can be said to be in some sense
continuous and systematic, it is whether that corporation’s ‘affiliations with
the State are so continuous and systematic as to render [it] essentially at home
in the forum State.’”) (quoting Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919) (internal quotations
omitted).
22. See infra note 148 and accompanying text.
23. Pennsylvania’s registration statute explicitly sets out that registering
to do business in the state “shall constitute a sufficient basis of jurisdiction to
enable the tribunals of this Commonwealth to exercise general personal
jurisdiction.” Compare 42 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5301(a)(2)(i) (West
2020) (conferring general jurisdiction in Pennsylvania over foreign
corporations that “qualif[y]” as a foreign corporation in Pennsylvania) with
Bane v. Netlink, Inc., 925 F.2d 637 (3d Cir. 1991) (applying Pennsylvania’s
registration statute). Similarly, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, and New Mexico
have registration statutes which are silent as to jurisdictional consequences,
but whose courts have interpreted the statutes as requiring consent to general
jurisdiction. Compare IOWA CODE ANN. § 490.1501(1) (West 2020) (requiring a
foreign corporation to obtain a certificate of authority from the Secretary of
State before transacting business in Iowa) with Spanier v. Am. Pop Corn Co.,
No. C15-4071-MWB, 2016 WL 1465400, at *4 (N.D. Iowa Apr. 14, 2016)
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would be satisfied by virtue of the defendant’s voluntary consent
through its registration.24
The results have been mixed. Since Daimler, the supreme
courts of nine states—California,25 Colorado,26 Delaware,27

(denying two defendants’ motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction
because the defendants “maintain[ed] registered agents for service of process
in Iowa” and thus “have consented to jurisdiction here”); compare MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 303.10 (West 2020) (requiring non-Minnesota corporations to have a
registered office and a registered agent), with Knowlton v. Allied Van Lines,
Inc., 900 F.2d 1196, 1200 (8th Cir. 1990) (“[A]ppointment of an agent for
service of process . . . gives consent to the jurisdiction of Minnesota courts for
any cause of action, whether or not arising out of activities within the state.”);
Werner v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 861 P.2d 270 (N.M. App. 1993).
24. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 n.14 (1985)
(“[B]ecause the personal jurisdiction requirement is a waivable right, there are
a ‘variety of legal arrangements’ by which a litigant may give ‘express or
implied consent to the personal jurisdiction of the court.’”) (quoting Ins. Corp.
of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703 (1982))).
25. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 377 P.3d 874, 884
(Cal. 2016) (“[A] corporation’s appointment of an agent for service of process,
when required by state law, cannot compel its surrender to general jurisdiction
for disputes unrelated to its California transactions.”), rev’d on other grounds,
137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017).
26. See Magill v. Ford Motor Co., 379 P.3d 1033, 1038–39 (Colo. 2016)
(finding no general jurisdiction via corporate registration because the
defendant’s contacts “pale[d] in comparison to the significant contacts that
were deemed ‘slim’ in Daimler”).
27. See Genuine Parts Co. v. Cepec, 137 A.3d 123, 128 (Del. 2016)
(“Daimler makes plain that it is inconsistent with principles of due process to
exercise general jurisdiction over a foreign corporation that is not ‘essentially
at home’ in a state for claims having no rational connection to the state . . . .
Hence, Delaware cannot exercise general jurisdiction over it consistent with
principles of due process.”).
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Illinois,28 Missouri,29 Montana,30 Nebraska,31 Oregon,32 and
Wisconsin33—have held that registering to do business in their
state does not amount to consent to general personal
jurisdiction,34 while one state—Georgia—has upheld consent by
registration.35 In five states where consent by registration is

28. See Aspen Am. Ins. Co. v. Interstate Warehousing, Inc., 90 N.E.3d
440, 447 (Ill. 2017) (“[T]he fact that a foreign corporation has registered to do
business under [Illinois’s business registration statute] does not mean that the
corporation has thereby consented to general jurisdiction over all causes of
action, including those that are completely unrelated to the corporation’s
activities in Illinois.”).
29. See State ex rel. Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Dolan, 512 S.W.3d 41, 51 (Mo.
2017) (“[A] broad inference of consent based on registration would allow
national corporations to be sued in every state, rendering Daimler pointless.”).
30. See DeLeon v. BNSF Ry. Co., 426 P.3d 1, 4 (Mont. 2018) (“[A] company
does not consent to general personal jurisdiction by registering to do business
in Montana and voluntarily conducting in-state business activities.”).
31. See Lanham v. BNSF Ry. Co., 939 N.W.2d 363, 371 (Neb. 2020)
(“[T]reating BNSF’s registration to do business in Nebraska as implied consent
to personal jurisdiction would exceed the due process limits prescribed in
[Goodyear] and [Daimler].”).
32. See Figueroa v. BNSF Ry. Co., 390 P.3d 1019, 1021 (Or. 2017) (“[T]he
legislature did not intend that appointing a registered agent pursuant to [the
Oregon registration statute] would constitute consent to the jurisdiction of the
Oregon courts.”).
33. See Segregated Acct. of Ambac Assurance Corp. v. Countrywide Home
Loans, 898 N.W.2d 70, 82 (Wis. 2017) (“[S]ubjecting foreign corporations to
general jurisdiction wherever they register an agent for service of process
would reflect the sprawling view of general jurisdiction rejected by the
Supreme Court in Goodyear.”) (internal quotations omitted).
34. Prior to Goodyear and Daimler, at least six other state supreme courts
(Maryland, Michigan, Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio, and South Carolina) had
already held the same. See Republic Props. Corp. v. Mission West Props., LP,
895 A.2d 1006 (Md. 2006); Renfroe v. Nichols Wire & Aluminum Co., 83
N.W.2d 590 (Mich. 1957); Freeman v. Second Jud. Dist. Ct., 1 P.3d 963 (Nev.
2000); Byham v. Nat’l Cibo House Corp., 143 S.E.2d 225 (N.C. 1965); Wainscott
v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry. Co., 351 N.E.2d 466 (Ohio 1976); Yarborough & Co. v.
Schoolfield Furniture Indus., 268 S.E.2d 42, 44 (S.C. 1980).
35. See Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. McCall, __ S.E.2d __, 2021 WL
4268074, at *11 (Ga. 2021) (“[B]ecause Cooper Tire is registered and
authorized to do business in Georgia, Cooper Tire is currently subject to the
general jurisdiction of our courts under [a prior] general-jurisdiction holding,
which we have decided to leave in place.”).

THE COST OF DOING BUSINESS

63

alive—Pennsylvania,36 Minnesota,37 Iowa,38 New Mexico,39 and
Kansas40—state and federal appellate courts endorsed the
concept in pre-Daimler decisions that their lower courts have
largely followed ever since. More broadly, though, courts across
the country—some even within the same judicial district
interpreting the same registration statute41—continue to clash
on whether registration to do business can ever serve as valid
consent to jurisdiction, let alone general jurisdiction. The
palpable discord among the states undoubtedly makes it high
time for the issue to reach the United States Supreme Court,42
as it has in the New York Court of Appeals,43 New Mexico

36. See Bane v. Netlink, 925 F.2d 637, 641 (3d Cir. 1991) (“[B]ecause
Netlink was authorized to do business in Pennsylvania, it was subject to the
exercise of personal jurisdiction by Pennsylvania courts . . . .”).
37. See Knowlton v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 900 F.2d 1196, 1199 (8th Cir.
1990) (holding that the defendant’s appointment of Minnesota agent for
service of process operated as consent to jurisdiction of Minnesota courts).
38. Compare id., with Spanier v. Am. Pop Corn Co., No. C15-4071-MWB,
2016 WL 1465400 (N.D. Iowa Apr. 14, 2016) (following Knowlton).
39. See Werner v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 861 P.2d 270, 273 (N.M. App.
1993) (concluding that, “without an express limitation, the [New Mexico]
legislature intended for [the state’s business registration statute] to apply to
any claims against a foreign corporation with a registered agent in New
Mexico”); Brieno v. Paccar, Inc., No. 17-cv-867-SCY/KBM, 2018 WL 3675234
(D.N.M. Aug. 2, 2018) (following Werner).
40. Merriman v. Crompton Corp., 146 P.3d 162, 174 (Kan. 2006) (holding
that the Kansas registration statute “provides a basis for general jurisdiction
over foreign corporations”).
41. Compare In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 384 F. Supp. 3d
532, 534 (E.D. Pa. 2019) (finding that the consent-by-registration theory is
“irretrievably irreconcilable with the teachings of Daimler, and can no longer
stand”), with Kraus v. Alcatel-Lucent, 441 F. Supp. 3d 68, 70 (E.D. Pa. 2020)
(holding that Pennsylvania’s consent-by-registration statute is constitutional).
42. See generally Michael Huston, Sean Cooksey & David Casazza,
‘Consent’ is the Next Big Battle Over Personal Jurisdiction, S.F. DAILY J. (July
5, 2017), https://perma.cc/3497-V99M; see also Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes &
Cassandra Burke Robertson, Toward A New Equilibrium in Personal
Jurisdiction, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 207, 259–60 (2014) (opining that consent
by registration is “ripe for invalidation by the Supreme Court”).
43. Aybar v. Aybar, 2021 NY 54U (2021), https://perma.cc/9B4W-RDL6.
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Supreme Court,44 Pennsylvania Supreme Court,45 and Georgia
Supreme Court46 in 2021 alone.
One of the most recurrent critiques of the
consent-by-registration theory is that by registering to do
business in a state, a corporation is not giving valid, knowing
consent to general jurisdiction.47 Pennsylvania’s statute is the
only law of its kind that explicitly tells the registrant that
signing up to do business in the state equals consent to general
jurisdiction in that state.48 For this reason, the argument
proceeds, registered businesses never receive fair notice of what
rights they are waiving when they register.49 One might argue
that even if the statute did expressly provide that notice, the
consent still would not be genuine because the corporation lacks
real alternatives to registration that would make the consent
free and voluntary.50 This Note sets out to address these
44. Oral Argument at 38:00, Rodriguez v. Ford Motor Co. (N.M. 2021)
(No. S-1-SC-37491), https://perma.cc/GGG8-MA4E (plaintiff’s counsel
addressing “the issue of whether consent by registration remains
constitutional”)
45. Oral Argument at 1:07:30, Mallory v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co. (Pa. 2021)
(No. 3 EAP 2021), https://perma.cc/8ZE8-94L5 (“This case is about whether
Norfolk Southern can be subjected to general jurisdiction based on the
voluntary actions that it did—the voluntary consent, when it registered under
Pennsylvania laws to be a foreign corporation.”).
46. See generally Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. McCall, __ S.E.2d __, 2021
WL 4268074 (Ga. 2021).
47. See, e.g., Tanya J. Monestier, Registration Statutes, General
Jurisdiction, and the Fallacy of Consent, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1343, 1347 (2015)
(“[R]egistration cannot fairly be regarded as express—or even
implied— consent to personal jurisdiction.”).
48. See Rich Samp, Personal Jurisdiction By ‘Consent’ May Be on the Way
Out—Even in Pennsylvania, FORBES (June 27, 2019), https://perma.cc/W7CCQDFF (“[Pennsylvania’s] statute includes a provision not contained in many
other States’ registration laws: it says explicitly that by registering, a
nonresident corporation consents to the general jurisdiction of Pennsylvania
courts over any and all claims filed against the corporation, even claims that
bear no relation to Pennsylvania.”).
49. See Monestier, supra note 47, at 1388 (“[T]he statutory source upon
which courts pin their jurisdictional power does not provide any notice to
corporations that by registering to do business and appointing an agent for
service of process they are relinquishing due process protections.”).
50. See id. at 1389 (“Aside from registering to do business in the state and
thereby consenting to general jurisdiction, a corporation really only has one of
two choices: not do business in the state or do business in the state without
registering and face whatever penalties the law ascribes.”).
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criticisms and ultimately offers that, under certain statutory
and common law schemes, corporations can effect valid consent
to general jurisdiction when they register to do business in a
state.51
Part II provides a background on consent as it relates to
personal jurisdiction doctrine and discusses the landscape of
general personal jurisdiction prior to and following the
Goodyear and Daimler decisions.52 Part III recalls the role that
registration statutes played before International Shoe Co. v.
Washington53 and parses the Supreme Court’s limited modern
commentary on consent jurisdiction, questioning whether the
core holdings of either Goodyear or Daimler had any abrogative
effect on consent by registration.54
Part IV argues that corporations can, in some instances,
give valid consent to general jurisdiction in a state through
registration to do business.55 Part IV addresses concerns related
to notice and voluntariness, suggesting that where either
express statutory language or decisional law makes it clear that
registering under a given statute constitutes consent to general
jurisdiction, corporations are put on fair notice of the
jurisdictional consequences of such registration. Part V
concludes the Note by recommending, in the interest of
efficiency and predictability, that state legislatures take firm
control of the consent-by-registration landscape in their
jurisdictions by amending their registration statutes to be
explicit as to the jurisdictional consequences, regardless of
whether they decide to uphold or reject consent by registration.56

51. See, e.g., Otsuka Pharm. Co. v. Mylan Inc., 106 F. Supp. 3d 456, 469
(D.N.J. 2015) (“[D]esignation of an in-state agent for service of process in
accordance with a state registration statute may constitute consent to
personal jurisdiction, if supported by the breadth of the statute’s text or
interpretation.”).
52. See infra Part II.
53. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
54. See infra Part III.
55. See infra Part IV.
56. See infra Part V.
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II. CONSENT AND GENERAL JURISDICTION

The distinction between specific and general personal
jurisdiction is crucial to understanding the pressure points of
this discussion. Specific personal jurisdiction allows a court to
claim jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant for a given
lawsuit if (1) that suit arises out of, or is related to, the
defendant’s activities in the forum state;57 and (2) if the exercise
of jurisdiction in that specific case would not offend “traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.”58 There must be
some “affiliation between the forum State and the underlying
controversy”—most likely an activity or occurrence “that takes
place in the forum State and that is therefore subject to the
State’s regulation.59 The defendant must “purposefully avail[]
itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum
State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.”60
This ensures “that a defendant will not be haled into a
jurisdiction solely as a result of ‘random,’ ‘fortuitous,’ or
‘attenuated’ contacts.”61 In the end, though, when a court finds
specific jurisdiction over a defendant, it does so only for that
particular case.
General personal jurisdiction, however, is much broader in
nature. If a defendant has an especially strong relationship with
a state (for example, if the person permanently resides in that
state, or the company is headquartered there), then a court may
have general jurisdiction over that defendant, meaning that
defendant can be sued in that state’s courts on any claim—even
those that have nothing to do with the defendant’s contacts with
the state.62 As a general rule, a court that exercises either form
57. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408,
414 (1984) (“When a controversy is related to or ‘arises out of’ a defendant’s
contacts with the forum, the Court has said that a ‘relationship among the
defendant, the forum, and the litigation’ is the essential foundation of in
personam jurisdiction.”) (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977)).
58. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945).
59. See Bristol Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773,
1780 (2017).
60. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985).
61. See id. at 475 (quoting Keeton v. Hustler Mag., Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774
(1984)).
62. See Scott Dodson, Personal Jurisdiction and Aggregation, 113 NW. U.
L. REV. 1, 17 (2018) (“General jurisdiction could be asserted over a defendant
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of jurisdiction where the defendant’s contacts are insufficient to
do so is in violation of the Due Process Clause.63
However, a defendant’s consent to personal jurisdiction, or
waiver of challenges to personal jurisdiction, is a
long-recognized exception to the Due Process and long-arm
statutory analysis.64 Where a defendant agrees to be sued, there
is no need to assess whether that defendant has sufficient
contacts with the state to be “haled into court”65 there.66
A. Personal Jurisdiction as a Waivable Right
Personal jurisdiction is, first and foremost, a right.67 A civil
procedure textbook might characterize it as a court’s right to
make binding decisions concerning the liabilities and duties of
particular parties in particular civil actions.68 At its core,
though, personal jurisdiction creates an individual right:69 the
right to be free from the binding judgment of courts attempting

with a strong connection to the state, even if the cause of action arose
elsewhere and was unrelated to the defendant’s contacts with the state.”).
63. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877) (discussing the
connection between personal jurisdiction and the Due Process Clause).
64. See Knowlton v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 900 F.2d 1196, 1199 (8th Cir.
1990) (“Consent is the other traditional basis of jurisdiction, existing
independently of long-arm statutes.”).
65. Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 475.
66. See, e.g., DeLeon v. BNSF Ry. Co., 426 P.3d 1, 6 (Mont. 2018) (noting
that due process is not offended when a defendant “waives its
constitutional due process protections
by consenting to personal jurisdiction”).
67. See Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456
U.S. 694, 703 (1982) (“[P]ersonal jurisdiction represents first of all an
individual right.”).
68. See Personal Jurisdiction, CORNELL L. SCH., available at
https://perma.cc/N6E8-L8SL (“Personal jurisdiction refers to the power that a
court has to make a decision regarding the party being sued in a case.”); see
also Hand Cut Steaks Acquisitions v. Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon of Neb.,
298 Neb. 705, 722 (2018) (“Personal jurisdiction is the power of a tribunal to
subject and bind a particular person or entity to its decisions.”).
69. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 879 (2011)
(plurality opinion) (explaining that personal jurisdiction is a Due Process right
not to be subject to the adjudicatory authority of a sovereign); Ins. Corp. of Ir.
v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703 (1982) (“[The personal
jurisdiction requirement] represents a restriction on judicial power not as a
matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of individual liberty.”).
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to exceed their constitutional limitations.70 It is tethered to the
Due Process Clause,71 and thereby provides protections to
individuals.72 This distinction is pivotal. At its foundation,
personal jurisdiction doctrine is a product of personal autonomy,
not structural integrity. It is a right that belongs to the
people—to be wielded as they wish;73 unlike, for example,
subject-matter jurisdiction, which is a structural requirement
by the court, not a personal right that one could simply consent
to or waive.74
The Supreme Court established the now well-settled
principle that a party can waive the jurisdictional protections of
the Due Process Clause.75 While in some instances a party might
involuntarily waive its Due Process protections,76 more often
when parties waive this right, they do so by voluntarily
70. See John N. Drobak, The Federalism Theme in Personal Jurisdiction,
68 IOWA L. REV. 1015, 1015 (1983) (explaining that personal jurisdiction
doctrine “gives litigants the individual right to protect themselves from
overreaching courts”).
71. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (internal
quotations omitted)
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a
judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum,
he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the
suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.

72. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law . . . .”) (emphasis
added).
73. See Drobak, supra note 70, at 1018 (summarizing the Supreme
Court’s finding in Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de
Guinee that “the requirement of personal jurisdiction is a legal right protecting
the individual, as shown by the ability of a defendant to waive that right”).
74. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that
it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”); see
also Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 814 F.3d 619, 625 (2d Cir. 2016)
(“[U]nlike subject matter jurisdiction, a party may simply consent to a court’s
exercise of personal jurisdiction: for example, an entity may contract or
stipulate with another to permit proceedings in a state’s courts,
notwithstanding the remoteness from the state of its operations and
organization.”).
75. See Ins. Corp. of Ir., 456 U.S. at 703 (“[Personal jurisdiction rights]
can, like other such rights, be waived.”).
76. See Drobak, supra note 70, at 1018 (“Besides a voluntary waiver, a
defendant can lose the legal right by failing to comply with certain procedural
rules . . . [t]he loss occurs because the expression of legal rights in a court is
subject to procedural rules.”).
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consenting to jurisdiction, offering some manifestation of an
intent to litigate in the chosen forum.77 One way to give consent
to a court’s jurisdiction would be to appear in or otherwise
contest the merits of a lawsuit after filing.78 Another way would
be through a pre-suit agreement by the parties to submit to the
jurisdiction of a court, such as a forum selection clause in a
contract.79
The bulk of American personal jurisdiction doctrine
concerns the rights of the defendant;80 rarely, if ever, do courts
see issues of jurisdiction pertaining to the plaintiff.81 The reason
for this—unremarkable to most law students and practicing
lawyers—is that the plaintiff is presumed to have consented to
jurisdiction by choosing to file suit in that court.82 Normally the
inertia of the lawsuit would then shift to the defendant, who has
the option to dispute personal jurisdiction,83 enforcing that same
individual right which the plaintiff has already waived.84
Alternatively, the defendant could also waive that right by
consenting to personal jurisdiction and litigating the suit, either

77. See Ins. Corp. of Ir., 456 U.S. at 703–04 (describing six ways that a
defendant could consent to personal jurisdiction).
78. See id. (“[A]n individual may submit to the jurisdiction of the court by
appearance.”).
79. See Nat’l Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 315–16 (1964)
(recognizing contractual consent as a basis for jurisdiction).
80. See Scott Dodson, Plaintiff Personal Jurisdiction and Venue Transfer,
117 MICH. L. REV. 1463, 1466 (2019) (“[T]he overwhelming body of cases and
commentary on personal jurisdiction has focused on its applicability to
defendants.”).
81. See DANIEL V. DAVIDSON & LYNN M. FORSYTHE, BUSINESS IN THE
CONTEMPORARY LEGAL ENVIRONMENT 79 (2d ed. 2016) (“Questions do not arise
about the court’s jurisdiction over the plaintiff.”). But see Dodson, supra note
80, at 1466 (“But the Due Process Clauses protect ‘persons,’ not just
defendants, so plaintiffs arguably have similar entitlements to the protections
of personal jurisdiction.”).
82. See id. (“The plaintiff chose to file the suit in a particular court and so
implicitly consents to the court’s jurisdiction.”).
83. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(2).
84. See Dodson, supra note 80, at 1466 (“In most cases, consent obviates
any protections: the plaintiff’s act of filing a complaint in a court manifests the
plaintiff’s consent to the personal jurisdiction of that court for purposes of
resolving the claims asserted in that complaint.”).
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via voluntary appearance or submission, as discussed above.85
In some cases, the defendant might have already waived
jurisdictional challenges by consenting pre-suit through an
agreement.86 Though these processes are familiar, they also
demonstrate the unavoidable role of consent in personal
jurisdiction. Every civil action begins—in an unassuming
way—with consent to personal jurisdiction.
When parties make the decision to waive Due Process
protections, they more often are consenting to specific personal
jurisdiction.87 But a question less often asked is whether—and
if so, how—a party could give consent to general personal
jurisdiction.88 If such consent is permissible, it is definitely
uncommon among private parties contracting with other private
parties. After all, when negotiating a private agreement, a
company does not have much incentive to require another
company to consent to personal jurisdiction for cases unrelated
to the agreement itself.89
But what about state governments? States might have their
own sovereign interests in providing a forum for suit,90 even if
personal jurisdiction over the defendant in those cases would
not otherwise fit within the vexing goalposts of minimum
contacts.91 Remember Amina Diab, who was harmed by a large
85. See Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S.
694, 703 (1982) (“[A]n individual may submit to the jurisdiction of the court by
appearance.”).
86. See Szukhent, 375 U.S. at 316 (“[P]arties to a contract may agree in
advance to submit to the jurisdiction of a given court.”).
87. See Lea Brilmayer et al., A General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66
TEX. L. REV. 721, 756 n.181 (1988) (“Consent to jurisdiction given in a private
contract ordinarily does not constitute consent to a jurisdiction over any cause
of action whatsoever.”).
88. See id. at 756 (“[P]arties conceivably might provide for jurisdiction
that is general in all respects.”).
89. See id. (explaining that this kind of consent clause is rarely included
in private contracts because “one party would have little reason to extract such
consent from another”).
90. See Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes & Cassandra Burke Robertson, A New
State Registration Act: Legislating a Longer Arm for Personal Jurisdiction, 57
HARV. J. LEGIS. 377, 408 (2020) (indicating that suits arising from an injury
suffered in the state, brought by state residents, governed by that state’s law,
or brought to enforce a judgment against people or property within that state
could implicate state sovereign interests).
91. See id. at 380 (“Even as [recent holdings of the Roberts Court] narrow
the outer due-process limits of the minimum-contacts standard, they leave
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corporation—registered to do business in all fifty states—due to
conduct occurring outside the United States.92 With
comparatively minimal resources, Diab—and others similarly
situated—might not be able to zealously pursue the claims in an
unfamiliar forum far from home. Unlike large corporations,
ordinary people usually do not have relationships with local
counsel in multiple states, and their bargaining power as a
plaintiff in settlement negotiations weakens with each accruing
litigation cost. A state government might want to fill that void
by requiring those corporations to consent to general
jurisdiction in that state as a prerequisite for doing business
there. It is on this issue—whether a state government could
constitutionally set such a requirement—that courts and
scholars vary widely.
B. The Waning Crescent of General Jurisdiction After Goodyear
and Daimler
Until the mid-nineteenth century, notions of territorial
sovereignty dominated Due Process personal jurisdiction
doctrine.93 The mandate of Pennoyer v. Neff94 was that a person
could not be subjected to the jurisdiction of a court unless they
were actually was served with process within a court’s territory
or consented to the court’s jurisdiction.95 Applying this rule to
individuals was not terribly complicated, but the rise of
interstate commerce of the early twentieth century made its

room for the states to identify, assert, and enforce their interests in protecting
state residents and regulating in-state business activities through alternative
jurisdictional means.”).
92. See Diab v. British Airways, PLC, No. 20-3744, 2020 WL 6870607
(E.D. Pa. Nov. 23, 2020).
93. See id. at 720 (“The authority of every tribunal is necessarily
restricted by the territorial limits of the State in which it is established. Any
attempt to exercise authority beyond those limits would be deemed in every
other forum, as has been said by this court, in illegitimate assumption of
power, and be resisted as mere abuse.”) (citation omitted).
94. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
95. See 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 1064 (3d ed. 2014); Burnham v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 495 U.S.
604, 617 (1990) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion) (discussing Pennoyer’s “rigid
requirement of either ‘consent,’ or ‘presence’”) (internal citations omitted).

72

78 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 55 (2021)

application to corporations much more challenging.96 While a
company would undoubtedly be “present” in its state of
incorporation, less clear was whether it could fairly be deemed
present in the other states in which it does business.97
However, in 1945 the Supreme Court ushered in a “less
wooden understanding” of the limits of personal jurisdiction
over nonresident individuals and corporations98 through the
watershed case of International Shoe Co. v. Washington.99
There, the Court held that judicial authority over an out-of-state
defendant depends not on the defendant’s presence in the state,
but on the defendant having certain “minimum contacts with
[the State] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”100
International Shoe’s recalibration of the Due Process analysis
gave way to two distinct forms of jurisdiction: general (or
“all-purpose”) jurisdiction, and specific (or “case-linked”)
jurisdiction.101 From then on, the primary focus of the personal
jurisdiction inquiry became the “nature and extent of the
‘defendant’s relationship to the forum state.’”102
Since International Shoe, “specific jurisdiction has become
the centerpiece of modern jurisdiction theory” while general
jurisdiction has played “a reduced role.”103 From 1945 to 2011,
the Court addressed only two general jurisdiction cases: Perkins
v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.,104 in which the Court

96. See 16 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE - CIVIL
§ 108.23 (2012) (“Fitting personal jurisdiction over corporations, which have
no physical body, into [the physical power theory of jurisdiction] posed some
problems.”).
97. See id.
98. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 118 (2014).
99. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
100. See id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
101. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915,
919 (2011) (citations omitted).
102. See Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017,
1024 (2021) (quoting Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 137 S. Ct.
1773, 1779 (2017)).
103. See Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 925 (quoting Mary Twitchell, The Myth of
General Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REV. 610, 628 (1988)) (internal quotations
omitted).
104. 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
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upheld the exercise of general jurisdiction over the defendant,105
and Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall,106 in
which the Court found general jurisdiction lacking.107 Read
together, Perkins and Helicopteros defined the contours of the
“continuous and systematic general business contacts”108
necessary to exercise general jurisdiction.109 Lower courts would
evaluate the totality of the defendant’s contacts with the forum
to assess whether they constitute “the kind of continuous and
systematic contacts required to satisfy due process,”110 using
Perkins and Helicopteros as the outer bounds.111 A dearth of
further guidance in this area112 led to uncertainty and
inconsistent results, creating headaches for non-US entities and
an overwhelming burden for large domestic companies.113
However, in the 2010s, with the status of general
jurisdiction still in flux, the Court decided Goodyear Dunlop

105. See id. at 448 (“[I]t would not violate federal due process for Ohio
either to take or decline jurisdiction of the corporation in this proceeding.”).
106. 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
107. See id. at 418–19 (concluding that the defendant’s contacts with the
forum state “were insufficient to satisfy the requirements of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment”).
108. See id. at 416.
109. See Perkins, 342 U.S. at 438 (“The corporation has been carrying on
in [the forum state] a continuous and systematic, but limited, part of its
general business.”).
110. Holt Oil & Gas Corp. v. Harvey, 801 F.2d 773, 779 (5th Cir. 1986).
The Perkins Court indicated that contacts that might be continuous and
systematic include “directors’ meetings, business correspondence, banking,
stock transfers, payment of salaries, purchasing of machinery, etc.” See
Perkins, 342 U.S. at 445.
111. See, e.g., Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Robertson-Ceco Corp., 84 F.3d 560 (2d
Cir.
1996)
(“Many
cases,
including
this
one,
fall
between Perkins and Helicopteros.”).
112. See Alan M. Trammell, A Tale of Two Jurisdictions, 68 VAND. L. REV.
501, 511 (2015) (noting that, by this point, the Court had “offered no real clues
about how to analyze cases that fell into the vast expanse
between Helico[pteros] and Perkins”).
113. See Monestier, supra note 47, at 1353–54 (noting that as general
jurisdiction doctrine developed, non-US defendants were “unable to predict
with any degree of certainty where they would be subject to general
jurisdiction . . . [l]arge multinational corporations . . . would likely be
regarded as having continuous and systematic general business contacts in all
fifty states.”).
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Tires v. Brown114 and Daimler AG v. Bauman.115 In doing so, the
Court replaced the irresolution from the twentieth century with
a much stricter test for general jurisdiction than was previously
in place.116
1.

Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown

In many respects, Goodyear “ultimately marked the
beginning of the end for doing business jurisdiction,”117 as the
Court put a leash on the “continuous and systematic” standard
by introducing the “at home” test.118
Goodyear involved two thirteen-year-old boys from North
Carolina who died in a bus accident while in France.119 Their
parents, believing the cause of the accident to be a defective tire
manufactured by foreign subsidiaries of The Goodyear Tire and
Rubber Company, sued Goodyear for damages in North Carolina
state court.120 The question was whether the North Carolina
court could exercise general personal jurisdiction over the
foreign manufacturers121—who had not registered to do
business in North Carolina, had not advertised or shipped to
customers in North Carolina, and whose only contact with North
Carolina was a negligible supply of tires made abroad that
reached North Carolina through the stream of commerce.122 For
these reasons, Goodyear could be seen as “an easy case,”123
114. 564 U.S. 915 (2011).
115. 571 U.S. 117 (2014).
116. See Brooke A. Weedon, Note, New Limits on General Personal
Jurisdiction: Examining the Retroactive Application of Daimler in
Long-Pending Cases, 72 WASH & LEE L. REV. 1549, 1551–52 (2015).
117. See Monestier, supra note 47, at 1354.
118. See Rhodes & Robertson, supra note 90, at 389 (explaining that
Goodyear “retain[ed] earlier iterations that substantial ‘continuous and
systematic’ affiliations were necessary for general jurisdiction” but also “added
to the description that such affiliations has to render the defendant ‘essentially
at home’ in the forum”) (internal citations omitted).
119. See Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 918.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 923.
122. Id. at 921.
123. See Linda J. Silberman, The End of Another Era: Reflections on
Daimler and Its Implications for Judicial Jurisdiction in the United States, 19
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 675, 677 (2015) (“On its facts, Goodyear was an easy
case under the established Supreme Court and lower court precedents. Mere
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reflected by the Court’s unanimous holding that the Goodyear
subsidiaries were not subject to general jurisdiction in North
Carolina.124
But the disposition of the case was not the most significant
detail in Goodyear. Rather, it was the Court’s insistence that a
defendant corporation is subject to general jurisdiction only
when the corporation is fairly regarded as “at home” in the
forum state.125 The Court clarified that general jurisdiction
requires more than just any sort of continuous activity in the
state,126 but rather that “‘continuous and systematic general
business contacts’” would be necessary.127 The Court then
offered examples of the “paradigm” forum for general
jurisdiction over individuals and corporations—for an
individual: the person’s domicile; and for corporations: “an
equivalent place, one in which the corporation is fairly regarded
as at home.”128 For this proposition, the Court cited Professor
Lea Brilmayer of Yale, who identified the place of incorporation
and principal place of business as paradigm states in which
general jurisdiction could be exercised.129 But in the Goodyear
opinion, paradigm examples and “textbook case[s]”130 are where
the clarification ended. The Court did not discuss any less
paradigmatic situations in which contacts-based general
jurisdiction might still be proper, nor did it say outright that the
sales into the forum state—whether direct or as part of the stream of
commerce—had never been sufficient to satisfy the systematic and continuous
activity necessary to satisfy general jurisdiction.”) (internal citations and
quotations omitted).
124. See Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 931.
125. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915,
931 (2011) (“[Goodyear’s] attenuated connections to [North Carolina] . . . fall
far short of the ‘the continuous and systematic general business contacts’
necessary to empower North Carolina to entertain suit against them on claims
unrelated to anything that connects them to the State.”) (quoting Helicopteros,
466 U.S., at 416).
126. See id. at 927 (“A corporation’s ‘continuous activity of some sorts
within a state’ . . . is not enough to support the demand that the corporation
be amenable to suits unrelated to that activity.”) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945)).
127. See id. at 929 (quoting Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 416).
128. Id. at 924.
129. See id. (citing Brilmayer et al., supra note 87, at 728).
130. See id. at 927–28 (referring to the Court’s exercise of general
jurisdiction in Perkins).
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examples given were the outer bounds for general jurisdiction.
But to the extent that Goodyear left these doors open, Daimler
shut them four years later.
2.

Daimler AG v. Bauman

In Daimler, twenty-two Argentinian residents sued
Daimler AG, a German company, in the Northern District of
California.131 They alleged that during Argentina’s “Dirty War,”
Daimler’s Argentinian subsidiary—Mercedez-Benz Argentina
(MB Argentina)—”collaborated with state security forces to
kidnap, detain, torture, and kill certain MB Argentina
workers,”132 including the plaintiffs and their relatives. The
plaintiffs argued that because Mercedez-Benz USA (MBUSA)
had substantial contacts with California, the Northern District
could exercise general personal jurisdiction over Daimler.133 The
case presented the novel question of whether a parent company
could be subjected to general jurisdiction in a forum based on
the forum contacts of its subsidiary,134 but the Court instead
assumed the premise and decided that even if MBUSA’s
contacts with California could be imputed to Daimler, California
still could not exercise general jurisdiction over it, “for Daimler’s
slim contacts with the State hardly render it at home there.”135
The Daimler Court acknowledged that the Goodyear
opinion offered only the two “exemplar bases” for general
jurisdiction and not an exhaustive list.136 In the same breath,
though, the Court declined to exercise general jurisdiction
beyond those bases, reasoning that to do so would have been
“unacceptably grasping.”137 The Court clarified that, under
Goodyear, contacts sufficient to subject the defendant to general
jurisdiction are not just “in some sense continuous and

131. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 120 (2014).
132. See id. at 121.
133. See id.
134. See id. at 134.
135. Id. at 136 (emphasis added).
136. See id. at 137 (“Goodyear did not hold that a corporation may be
subject to general jurisdiction only in a forum where it is incorporated or has
its principal place of business; it simply typed those places paradigm
all-purpose forums.”).
137. See id. at 137–38.
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systematic,”138 but rather are “so continuous and systematic as
to render [it] essentially at home in the forum State.”139 Because
neither Daimler nor MBUSA were incorporated in California or
maintained their principal places of business there, the Court
reasoned that it could not exercise general jurisdiction in
California based on their other contacts.140 The Daimler Court,
however, added an important disclaimer in a footnote of the
opinion, which left open “the possibility that in an exceptional
case . . . a corporation’s operations in a forum other than its
formal place of incorporation or principal place of business may
be so substantial and of such a nature as to render the
corporation at home in that State.”141
When general jurisdiction emerged from the rubble of the
early 2010s, it was a shell of its former self. The purpose of
International Shoe was to expand the reach of personal
jurisdiction,142 but with just two words,143 the Goodyear Court
squeezed general jurisdiction from a doctrine of inclusion to one
of exclusion.144 The Daimler Court twisted the knife by doubling
down on Goodyear and elucidating that the place of
incorporation and principal place of business are—outside of an
138. See id. at 139 (internal quotations omitted).
139. Id. (citing Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S.
915, 919 (2011)).
140. See id. (finding that the Ninth Circuit erred in concluding that
“Daimler, even with MBUSA’s contacts attributed to it, was at home in
California”).
141. See id. at 139 n.19.
142. See Patrick J. Borchers, The Death of the Constitutional Law of
Personal Jurisdiction: From Pennoyer to Burnham and Back Again, 24 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV 19, 55 (1990) (“International Shoe signaled a broader reach for
state courts and an era of arguably fairer results.”); see also McGee v. Int’l Life
Ins. Co, 355 U.S. 220, 222 (1957) (“Looking back over [the history of personal
jurisdiction] a trend is clearly discernible toward expanding the permissible
scope of state jurisdiction over foreign corporations and other nonresidents.”).
143. See Rhodes & Robertson, supra note 90, at 389 (“Goodyear’s true
significance was introducing a new metaphor into the general jurisdiction
lexicon.”); Monestier, supra note 47, at 1355 (“[T]he significance of Goodyear
lies in two words: ‘at home.’”).
144. See Robin J. Effron, The Lost Story of Notice and Personal
Jurisdiction, 74 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 23, 100 (2018) (“Limiting the
general jurisdiction of domestic defendants to just one or two states drastically
changed the presumed access to courts that plaintiffs previously enjoyed
against large companies with a hefty business presence in many or even all
states.”).
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“exceptional case”145—the only available fora for contacts-based
general jurisdiction over a corporation.146
Absent from either opinion, though, is any meaningful
discussion of whether a party could consent to general
jurisdiction and waive its Due Process protections.147 While this
makes sense—the issue was not central to either case before the
Court—it also explains why the plaintiffs’ bar saw the
opportunity to gravitate to another theory: by registering to do
business, a corporation consents to general jurisdiction.148
Courts vary in their perception of what impact, if any, the
Daimler holding had on the continued viability of this theory,149
but there was enough ambiguity to compel plaintiffs to resort to
this argument.150 To best understand why plaintiffs perceived
the consent-by-registration argument to be a formidable one at
this point, it is important to contextualize corporate registration
statutes and how they were construed by the courts before
Goodyear and Daimler.

145.
146.

Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 139 n.19 (2014).
See Trammell, supra note 112, at 521

Daimler thus confirmed the most ambitious reading of Goodyear. A
corporation likely is subject to general jurisdiction only in a state where it
has incorporated or maintains its principal place of business. The Court has
left open only the slimmest possibility that general jurisdiction might be
permissible in a state that is the functional equivalent of one of those
paradigm examples. While such an exception is theoretically possible, the
Court suggests that it will be the rarest of rarities.

147. See infra Part III.C.
148. See Rhodes & Robertson, supra note 42, at 259–60 (2014) (“Given the
constriction of general jurisdiction in [Daimler], the natural next step for
plaintiffs is to seek other grounds for general jurisdiction . . . .”); Chris Carey,
Explicit Consent-By-Registration: Plaintiffs’ New Hope After the “At Home”
Trilogy, 67 U. KAN. L. REV. 195, 196 (2018) (“One such theory, increasingly
relied on by plaintiffs in the wake of the at home trilogy, is
consent-by-registration.”).
149. Compare In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 384 F. Supp. 3d
532, 534 (E.D. Pa. 2019) (finding that the consent-by-registration theory is
“irretrievably irreconcilable with the teachings of Daimler, and can no longer
stand”), with Webb-Benjamin, LLC v. Int’l Rug Grp., 192 A.3d 1133, 1139 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2018) (“Daimler does not eliminate consent as a method of obtaining
personal jurisdiction.”).
150. See Rhodes & Robertson, supra note 90, at 411 n.212 (referring to
several post-Daimler cases addressing consent via registration).
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III. CORPORATE REGISTRATION STATUTES
Every state has a statute that requires any corporation
doing business within a state to first be registered to do business
there.151 While these statutes vary in their specific language,
generally they require that all foreign corporations obtain a
certificate of authority from the Secretary of State and appoint
an agent for service of process before they can conduct
business.152 Exactly what constitutes “conducting business”
varies by state, but actions such as holding shareholder
meetings, maintaining bank accounts, or maintaining,
defending, or settling any proceeding will usually not be
considered transacting business.153 Registration statutes also
typically set out penalties for conducting in-state business
without registration, such as corporate fines or the inability to
maintain any action proceeding in a court in the state.154
A.

Consent by Registration Before International Shoe

When many state business registration statutes first arose
in the 1800s, territorial views of judicial authority—focusing on
the location of defendant’s physical presence and the
sovereignty of the states—defined personal jurisdiction
151. See Matthew Kipp, Inferring Express Consent: The Paradox of
Permitting Registration Statutes to Confer General Jurisdiction, 9 REV. LITIG.
1, 1 n.1 (1990) (stating that registration statutes exist in all fifty states).
152. See id. (explaining typical language in registration statutes). See, e.g.,
N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 1301(a) (McKinney 2020) (“A foreign corporation shall
not do business in this state until it has been authorized to do so as provided
in this article.”).
153. See, e.g., N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 1301(b) (McKinney 2020); VA. CODE
ANN. § 13.1-1059 (2020).
154. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1057(A) (2020) (“A foreign limited
liability company transacting business in the Commonwealth may not
maintain any action, suit, or proceeding in any court of the Commonwealth
until it has registered in the Commonwealth.”); id. at (D)
If a foreign limited liability company transacts business in the
Commonwealth without a certificate of registration, each member, manager
or employee of the limited liability company who does any of such business
in the Commonwealth knowing that a certificate of registration is required
and has not been obtained shall be liable for a penalty of not less than $500
and not more than $5,000 to be imposed by the Commission, after the
limited liability company and the individual have been given notice and an
opportunity to be heard.
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doctrine.155 The enactment of registration statutes was largely a
response to the perceived “manifest injustice”156 that would
result if a corporation could not be served simply because it was
only present in its home state.157 The statutes, coupled with the
recognition of consent in Pennoyer v. Neff,158 operated to create
the legal fiction of in-state corporate presence, and thus a basis
for jurisdiction.159
The notion that a state legislature could require a foreign
corporation to consent to jurisdiction as a condition of being
granted the right to do business in that state was recognized as
early as 1877, just over a decade after the Fourteenth
Amendment was passed. Ex parte Schollenberger160 dealt with a
Pennsylvania statute that required insurance companies doing
business in the state to consent to service of process on the state
insurance commissioner having “the same effect as if served
personally on the company within the State.”161 The Court
reasoned that “if the legislature of a State requires a foreign
corporation to consent to be ‘found’ within its territory, for the
purpose of the service of process in a suit, as a condition to doing
business in the State, and the corporation does so consent, the
fact that it is found gives the jurisdiction, notwithstanding the
finding was procured by consent.”162 In a specific personal
jurisdiction case five years later—St. Clair v. Cox163—the Court

155. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
156. St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350, 355 (1882) (“This doctrine of the
exemption of a corporation from suit in a state other than that of its creation,
was the cause of much inconvenience and often of manifest injustice.”).
157. See id. (“To meet and obviate this inconvenience and injustice, the
legislatures of several states interposed and provided for service of process on
officers and agents of foreign corporations doing business therein.”).
158. 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877) (recognizing a court’s right to subject
defendants to personal jurisdiction where they had voluntarily appeared or
“assented in advance” to service of process).
159. See Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 446–47
(1952) (citing cases “holding the corporation amenable to suit . . . by resort to
the legal fiction that it has given its consent to service and suit, consent being
implied from its presence in the state through the acts of its authorized
agents”).
160. 96 U.S. 369 (1877).
161. Id. at 374.
162. Id. at 377.
163. 106 U.S. 350 (1882).
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found that a state could require corporations to accept service of
process on it agents in all litigation arising out of its business in
the state as a condition of doing such business.164
The Supreme Court continued with this line of reasoning in
Pennsylvania Fire Insurance Co. of Philadelphia v. Gold Issue
Mining & Milling Co.165 There, the defendant, a Pennsylvania
insurance company, had registered to do business in Missouri
under its registration statute and appointed an in-state agent
for service of process.166 After contracting to insure buildings in
Colorado for the Gold Issue Mining and Milling Company (an
Arizona corporation), the property was struck by lightning and
destroyed.167 Gold Issue Mining sued Pennsylvania Fire in
Missouri state court on the Colorado insurance policy by serving
the Missouri service agent.168 Because the contracts at issue
were not made in Missouri, Pennsylvania Fire argued that it
could not be subjected to jurisdiction there. A unanimous Court
disagreed, noting that “the construction of the Missouri statute
thus adopted hardly leaves a constitutional question open.” As
the Court saw it, Pennsylvania Fire’s registration and voluntary
appointment of an agent for service of process in Missouri
constituted consent to suit in the state.169 On three other
occasions prior to International Shoe, the Court had the
opportunity to reconsider its jurisprudence in this area, yet it
repeatedly held that registration statutes could form the basis
for consent to personal jurisdiction, relying in part on

164.

See id. at 356

A corporation of one state cannot do business in another state without the
latter’s consent, express or implied, and that consent may be accompanied
with such conditions as it may think proper to impose . . . . The state may,
therefore, impose as a condition upon which a foreign corporation shall be
permitted to do business within her limits, that it shall stipulate that in any
litigation arising out of its transactions in the state, it will accept as
sufficient the service of process on its agents or persons specially designated,
and the condition would be eminently fit and just.

165. 243 U.S. 93 (1917).
166. Id. at 94.
167. See Gold Issue Mining & Mill. Co. v. Pa. Fire Ins. Co., 184 S.W. 999,
1000 (1916), aff’d, 243 U.S. 93 (1917).
168. Pa. Fire, 243 U.S. at 94–95.
169. Id. at 96 (“[W]hen a power is actually conferred by a document, the
party executing it takes the risk of the interpretation that may be put upon it
by the courts. The execution was the defendant’s voluntary act.”).
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Pennsylvania Fire.170 Importantly, in Robert Mitchell Furniture
Co. v. Selden Breck Construction Co.,171 the Court even
postulated that while the typical business registration and
appointment of a local agent might only provide consent to
jurisdiction over local acts, “the state law [could] either
expressly or by local construction give[ ] to the appointment a
larger scope.”172 Still, it recognized the idea of consent to some
form of jurisdiction via registration.
Some commentators argue that the Court’s support of
consent to jurisdiction via corporate registration and
appointment of an agent in this line of precedent was a relic of
the Pennoyer days that cannot survive International Shoe.173
But that interpretation favors a flow chart of assumptions over
the Court’s own holdings. In International Shoe, the Court
confined its analysis to cases where “no consent to be sued or
authorization to an agent to accept service of process has been
given.”174 Even though the Court’s support of consent by
registration came during a jurisprudential era that
International Shoe largely ushered out, the prior holdings in
favor of consent by registration still have force.175
170. See Robert Mitchell Furniture Co. v. Selden Breck Constr. Co., 257
U.S. 213 (1921); Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Chatters, 279 U.S. 320, 332 (1929)
(“[I]n the absence of an authoritative state decision giving a narrower scope to
the power of attorney filed under the state statute, it operates as a consent to
suit . . . .”) (citing Pa. Fire, 243 U.S. at 93); Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem
Shipbuilding Co., 308 U.S. 165, 176 (1939) (finding the defendant’s
registration to do business in New York and designation of an agent for service
of process to amount to consent to jurisdiction in New York courts).
171. 257 U.S. 213 (1921).
172. Id. at 216.
173. See, e.g., Cognitronics Imaging Sys. v. Recognition Rsch. Inc., 83 F.
Supp. 2d 689, 692 (E.D. Va. 2000)
Although the Supreme Court affirmed [the Pennsylvania Fire] principle in
1939, the Court’s decision in [International Shoe], cast doubt on the
continued viability of these cases. After International Shoe, the focus shifted
from whether the defendant had been served within the state to whether
the defendant’s contacts with the state justified the state’s assertion of
jurisdiction.

174. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945).
175. See, e.g., Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.,
490 U. S. 477, 484 (1989) (explaining that even when the holding of a Supreme
Court decision appears to be contradicted by the reasoning of another line of
decisions, the holding rather than the subsequent reasoning is binding on
lower courts).
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That said, the impact International Shoe had on consent by
registration was at least unclear, because some appellate courts
would continue to interpret state registration statutes as
soliciting consent to general jurisdiction through the twentieth
century (and today).
B.

Consent by Registration After International Shoe
1.

The Explicit Consent Statute

Pennsylvania stands alone in its consent-by-jurisdiction
framework. In 1978, Pennsylvania became the first—and
only—state to pass a statute that expressly provides for general
personal jurisdiction over corporations that register to do
business in the state.176 Under Title 42, Section 5301(a) of the
Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes, registration to do business
in Pennsylvania—which foreign corporations must do in order
to conduct business in Pennsylvania—constitutes consent to
general jurisdiction in Pennsylvania courts.177 The Third Circuit
confirmed as much in Bane v. Netlink,178 where it held that the
lower court erred in finding that Netlink—there the defendant
176. See Gorton v. Air & Liquid Sys. Corp., 303 F. Supp. 3d 278, 296 (M.D.
Pa. 2018) (citing 42 PA. CONS. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5301 (West 2020)). The
statute provides, in relevant part:
(a) General rule.--The existence of any of the following relationships
between a person and this Commonwealth shall constitute a sufficient basis
of jurisdiction to enable the tribunals of this Commonwealth to exercise
general personal jurisdiction over such person, or his personal
representative in the case of an individual, and to enable such tribunals to
render personal orders against such person or representative:

(2)
Corporations.—
i.
Incorporation under or qualification as a foreign
corporation under the laws of this Commonwealth.
ii.
Consent, to the extent authorized by the consent.
iii.
The carrying on of a continuous and systematic part of
its general business within this Commonwealth.
(b) Scope of jurisdiction.--When jurisdiction over a person is based upon this
section any cause of action may be asserted against him, whether or not
arising from acts enumerated in this section. Discontinuance of the acts
enumerated in subsection (a)(2)(i) . . . shall not affect jurisdiction with
respect to any act, transaction or omission occurring during the period such
status existed.

177.
178.

Id.
925 F.2d 637 (3d Cir. 1991).
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in an Age Discrimination in Employment Act claim—was not
subject to general jurisdiction in Pennsylvania despite being
registered to do business there.179 In a five-page opinion, the
Third Circuit reasoned that it did not need to decide whether
registration to do business would be a sufficiently continuous
and systematic contact with Pennsylvania to exercise general
jurisdiction (the standard at the time) because the registration
amounted to consent to such jurisdiction in Pennsylvania
courts.180 The court distinguished that situation from another
Third Circuit case, Provident National Bank v. California
Federal Savings and Loan Association,181 where the defendant
had not registered to do business in Pennsylvania.182
The analysis from those courts that follow Bane and apply
Pennsylvania’s statutory framework is straightforward:
“[B]ased upon the explicit language in [S]ection 5301, a
corporation consents to the general jurisdiction of Pennsylvania
courts when it applies for and receives a certificate of authority
from the state,”183 in satisfaction of Due Process.
2.

Implicit Consent Statutes

In some jurisdictions, while the state registration statutes
are not quite as explicit as that of Pennsylvania, courts interpret
the statutory language as soliciting consent to general
jurisdiction. For example, Minnesota’s business registration
scheme requires all foreign corporations wishing to do business
in Minnesota to register and appoint an in-state agent for
service of process.184 It requires service to be effected on the
registered agent,185 but if a registered corporation has not
appointed an agent, then service can be made on the Secretary
179. See id. at 640 (“[T]he court failed to consider the effect of Netlink’s
application for and receipt of authorization to do business in
Pennsylvania . . . .”).
180. See id.
181. 819 F.2d 434, 436 (3d Cir. 1987).
182. See Bane, 925 F.2d at 640 (“In [Provident], because the
defendant . . . had not applied to do business in Pennsylvania, we were obliged
to look to the question of its business activities in Pennsylvania.”) (internal
citations and quotations omitted).
183. See, e.g., Gorton, 303 F. Supp. 3d at 297.
184. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 303.10 (West 2020).
185. See id. § 303.13.
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of State; provided, however, that if the corporation has
withdrawn from the state, this type of service is valid “only
when based upon a liability or obligation of the corporation
incurred within this state or arising out of any business done in
this state by the corporation prior to the issuance of a certificate
of withdrawal.”186
Minnesota state and federal courts have consistently
interpreted these statutes as creating consent to general
jurisdiction for registered foreign corporations.187 In Knowlton
v. Allied Van Lines,188 the Eighth Circuit paid particular mind
to the statutory scheme, observing that the “words of
limitation . . . clearly indicate that the Legislature knew how to
limit the purposes of service of process when it wanted to do so,
and that provisions for service without such an express
limitation are intended to apply to any claims made against a
corporation with a registered agent within the state.”189 Noting
that “[t]he whole purpose of requiring designation of an agent
for service is to make a nonresident suable in the local courts,”190
the court concluded that “appointment of an agent for service of
process . . . gives consent to the jurisdiction of Minnesota courts
for any cause of action, whether or not arising out of activities
within the state.”191 Iowa federal courts have likewise relied on
Knowlton to conclude that compliance with Iowa’s registration
statute—which is “almost identical to that of Minnesota”192 and
does not explicitly address jurisdictional consequences of
registration—confers general jurisdiction.193 Courts in

186. See id. § 5.25 subdiv. 4.
187. See Knowlton v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 900 F.2d 1196, 1199 (8th Cir.
1990) (interpreting Minnesota law to find that the defendant consented to
general jurisdiction in Minnesota by complying with its registration statutes);
Rykoff-Sexton, Inc. v. Am. Appraisal Assoc., Inc., 469 N.W.2d 88, 90 (Minn.
1991) (exercising general jurisdiction over a foreign corporation where the
corporation had consented to service of process in Minnesota).
188. 900 F.2d 1196 (8th Cir. 1990).
189. Id. at 1199.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 1200.
192. Spanier v. Am. Pop Corn Co., No. C15-4071-MWB, 2016 WL 1465400,
at *4 n.3 (N.D. Iowa Apr. 14, 2016).
193. See id. at *4 (following Knowlton); Daughetee v. CHR Hansen, Inc.,
No. C09-4100-MWB, 2011 WL 1113868 (N.D. Iowa Mar. 25, 2011) (same).
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Kansas194 and New Mexico195 have adopted analogous
reasoning, all in pre-Daimler cases. Most recently, in Cooper
Tire & Rubber Co. v. McCall,196 the Georgia Supreme Court
confirmed that compliance with its silent registration statute
constitutes consent to general jurisdiction, affirming a thirty
year old decision of the court that held similarly.197
C.

Consent by Registration After Goodyear and Daimler

Fast forward to 2015—at which point the Supreme Court
had nearly eradicated contacts-based general jurisdiction
through Goodyear and Daimler—and plaintiffs began to pivot
toward consent-by-registration arguments in an attempt to
subject large corporations to general jurisdiction.
Given the Court’s decisions on general jurisdiction,
registration statutes, and consent in the preceding century,
several courts have reasonably concluded that Goodyear and
Daimler had no impact on the right of a defendant corporation
to consent to general jurisdiction through its registration to do
business.198 Up to that point, consent was a well-settled

194. Merriman v. Crompton Corp., 146 P.3d 162 (Kan. 2006).
195. Werner v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 861 P.2d 270, 272–73 (N.M. App.
1993); Brieno v. Paccar, Inc., No. 17-cv-867-SCY/KBM, 2018 WL 3675234
(D.N.M. Aug. 2, 2018) (following Werner).
196. ___ S.E.2d ___, 2021 WL 4268074 (Ga. 2021).
197. See id. at *1 (“[A]lthough Klein’s general-jurisdiction holding is in
tension with a recent line of United States Supreme Court cases . . . Klein does
not violate federal due process under [Pennsylvania Fire], a decision that the
Supreme Court has not overruled.”).
198. See, e.g., Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., 78 F. Supp.
3d 572, 576 (D. Del. 2015) (“While Daimler altered the analysis with respect
to general jurisdiction . . . Daimler does not change the fact that [the
defendant] consented to this Court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction when it
registered to do business and appointed an agent for service of process in the
State of Delaware.”); Kraus v. Alcatel-Lucent, 441 F. Supp. 3d 68, 75 (E.D. Pa.
2020) (“Because Daimler did not address whether registration to do business
is a sufficient basis for general personal jurisdiction, and neither the Supreme
Court nor the Third Circuit have addressed consent-based jurisdiction since
Daimler, we will apply Third Circuit precedent.”); Bors v. Johnson & Johnson,
208 F. Supp. 3d 648, 653 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (citation omitted) (concluding that
Daimler did not eliminate consent by registration and expressing support for
corporate registration as a means of conferring general jurisdiction in
Pennsylvania). But see, e.g., Lanham v. BNSF Ry. Co., 939 N.W.2d 363 (Neb.
2020) (concluding that “treating [the defendant’s] registration to do business
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permissible basis for personal jurisdiction.199 In late
nineteenth- and early twentieth-century cases, the Court had
recognized compliance with registration statutes as a proper
means of effecting that consent, and upheld the exercise of both
specific and general jurisdiction based on consent obtained from
corporate registration.200 Even after International Shoe
fundamentally changed personal jurisdiction analysis, several
circuit courts continued to hold that consent by registration
obviated Due Process analysis and that states could exercise
general jurisdiction based on that consent.201
If the Supreme Court intended to prohibit consent by
registration—or consent to general jurisdiction more
generally—through Goodyear or Daimler, it certainly could have
been clearer in doing so. Neither case explicitly discussed
registration statutes or whether a party could conceivably give
consent to general jurisdiction—unsurprising, as the question
was not central to either case.202 The question that follows, then,
is whether one could extrapolate from the holdings some new
limitation on a defendant’s right to waive Due Process
protections from general jurisdiction. But a gloss of both
opinions demonstrates that if consent was a permissible avenue
to obtaining general jurisdiction over a defendant before
Goodyear, it should remain available after Daimler.
The Goodyear Court’s introduction of the “at home”
phrase—identifying the place of incorporation and principal
place of business as “‘paradig[m]’ bases for the exercise of
jurisdiction”203—hardly forecloses the possibility that one could
in Nebraska as implied consent to personal jurisdiction would exceed the due
process limits prescribed in [Goodyear] and [Daimler]”).
199. See Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S.
694, 703 (1982).
200. See supra Part III.A.
201. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
202. In the Goodyear opinion, Justice Ginsburg briefly mentioned that the
petitioners—Goodyear subsidiaries in Luxembourg, Turkey, and
France— were not registered to do business in North Carolina. See Goodyear
Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 921 (2011). However,
this was not relevant to any consent theory, but rather was one fact that
helped demonstrate that the petitioners lacked the kind of “continuous and
systematic general business contacts” necessary to allow North Carolina to
exercise general jurisdiction on a claim unrelated to the state. See id. at 929.
203. See id. at 924 (citing Brilmayer et al., supra note 87, at 728).
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affect consent to general jurisdiction in fora other than those in
which the corporation would be at home. For one, even if the
Goodyear Court did intend the “at home” language to apply to
any and all exercises of general jurisdiction—whether based on
minimum contacts, presence, or consent—the fact that the
Court described paradigm examples of “at home” fora does not
definitively instruct lower courts that no other fora could ever
meet the threshold.204
Ultimately, however, that has no bearing on the question,
because the “at home” standard does not speak to whether a
defendant could still consent to jurisdiction, and thereby waive
its Due Process right to be sued only in its state of incorporation
or principal place of business. It clarified only what sorts of
contacts were necessary to constitutionally establish general
jurisdiction over an individual or corporation when such consent
is absent.205 Daimler in its entirety contains but one fleeting
reference to the concept of jurisdiction by consent, and it served
only to distinguish between consent jurisdiction and the
contact-based jurisdiction rules on which the decision was
predicated.206 Moreover, interpreting the mandate of Daimler as
restricting a party’s right to waive Due Process protections
would mean that even if a defendant wanted to consent to
general jurisdiction, structural limitations would not allow it to
204. Trammell, supra note 112, at 520 (“[T]he mere description of
paradigm examples does not deem them to be the exclusive places where
general jurisdiction is appropriate.”).
205. The manner in which the Goodyear Court introduced the “at home”
phrase reflects this; the Court insinuated that to be essentially at home in a
state is to have a certain degree of continuous and systematic contacts. See
Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919 (stating that a party is subject to general
jurisdiction in a state “when their affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous
and systematic’ as to render them essentially at home in the forum State”)
(emphasis added) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317
(1945)).
206. Justice Ginsburg made this reference toward the end of the opinion,
acknowledging that “[the Court’s] 1952 decision in [Perkins] remains the
textbook case of general jurisdiction appropriately exercised over a foreign
corporation that has not consented to suit in the forum.” Daimler AG v.
Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 129 (2014) (citing Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 927–28)
(emphasis added); see also Brett E. Broczkowski, Comment, Apparently, There
Are Places Like Home: A Path to Propriety for Consent-by-Registration
Jurisdiction in the Third Circuit, 64 VILL. L. REV. 101, 111 (2019) (“[T]he
Court’s only mention of consent as a means of obtaining jurisdiction came in a
passing reference to [Goodyear] . . . .”).
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do so. Such a reality “would threaten to fundamentally alter the
personal jurisdiction defense from a waivable to a non-waivable
right, a characteristic of the defense that was not before the
Daimler Court and is not explicitly addressed in its opinion.”207
It has been argued, though, that finding otherwise “would
expose companies with a national presence . . . to suit all over
the country, a result specifically at odds with Daimler.”208 But
that conclusion ignores the reality that only a minority of states
interpret their registration statutes as requiring consent to
general jurisdiction, and it is not clear that other states would
amend their registration statutes to require consent to general
jurisdiction (like Pennsylvania) if given the opportunity. Maybe
that is an indicator of where the “market” for consent by
registration stands today. A state legislature does not
necessarily have strong incentives to amend its registration
statute in this way. In a world in which companies gravitate to
states with the most advantageous tax benefits and corporate
governance laws, a state with a consent-by-registration statute
might struggle to stay competitive for the business of foreign
corporations. Alternatively, however, the state might instead
conclude that the benefits of acquiring general jurisdiction over
corporate registrants would outweigh the negative economic
impact of having fewer foreign corporations doing business in
the state.209
The Court had the opportunity in a recent general
jurisdiction case to address registration statutes and their
import on consent theories, but elected not to do so. In BNSF
Railway Co. v. Tyrrell,210 two railroad employees—neither of
whom lived in or had worked for BNSF in Montana—sued BNSF
under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act in Montana state
court, arguing that BNSF was “doing business” and “found
within” Montana by virtue of owning over 2,000 miles of railroad

207. See Acorda Therapeutics, 78 F. Supp. 3d at 591.
208. See AstraZeneca AB v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., 72 F. Supp. 3d 549, 557
(D. Del. 2014).
209. See Diab v. British Airways, PLC, No. 20-3744, 2020 WL 6870607
(slip op. at *5) (E.D. Pa. Nov. 23, 2020) (“The Pennsylvania legislature could
have concluded that the need to protect individuals and businesses by
providing them with a forum to seek redress for possible legal grievances was
worth the possible loss of business that might befall the Commonwealth.”).
210. 137 S. Ct. 1549 (2017).
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track, employing over 2,000 workers, and generating ten
percent of its annual revenue in Montana.211 Relying on
Goodyear and Daimler at length, the Supreme Court found
otherwise, holding that BNSF was not “at home” in Montana as
it was not incorporated in Montana, did not maintain its
principal place of business in Montana, nor was it “so heavily
engaged in activity in Montana ‘as to render [it] essentially at
home’ in the State.”212 Relevant to this discussion, however, is
that the employees had also advanced the consent by
registration theory, arguing that BNSF had consented to
all-purpose general jurisdiction in Montana by obtaining a
certificate of authority and appointing an in-state agent for
service of process.213
Tyrrell offered the Court with the chance to speak—even if
only in dicta—on consent by registration, but instead it
remanded the issue to the state court.214 Granted the Court
cannot answer questions not properly put before it, but if the
argument were, for example, “obnoxious to the Commerce
Clause, the Due Process Clause, or both,”215 one might expect
the Court would either have more to say on it or not have
mentioned it at all. That implication is exacerbated by the fact
that Justices Sotomayor and Ginsburg even seemed interested
in this question during oral argument.216 Justice Sotomayor
asked whether BNSF had registered to do business in
Montana217 (it had), and whether “the registration in Montana

211. See id. at 1553–54. The Montana Supreme Court had held that BNSF
could be “found within” Montana due to those contacts. See id. at 1554.
212. See id. at 1559 (citing Daimler, 571 U.S. at 138–39) (internal
quotations omitted).
213. See Plaintiffs’ Consolidated Answer Brief, at *16, BNSF Ry. Co. v.
Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549 (2017).
214. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. at 1559 (remanding the consent-by-registration
issue to the Montana state court to address this argument and explaining that
the Supreme Court is “a court of review, not of first view”).
215. See Pierre Riou, General Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations: All
That Glitters Is Not Gold Issue Mining, 14 REV. LITIG. 741, 748–49 (1995)
(summarizing commentators’ critiques of Justice Holmes’ opinion in
Pennsylvania Fire).
216. See Oral Argument at 4–6, BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549
(2017) (No. 16-405), https://perma.cc/J6UC-M5D9 (documenting exchanges
between counsel for BNSF and Justices Sotomayor, Ginsburg, and Roberts).
217. Id. at 4.
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[would] change this discussion.”218 As Justice Ginsburg observed
shortly thereafter, “there’s an argument[—]there was an
argument in the case we just heard that[—]that by registering,
you effectively consent to jurisdiction and consent is always a
good basis” for jurisdiction.219 Even in April 2017, with Daimler
in the rear-view mirror for over three years, two Justices were
interested in the validity of consent by registration.
As the consent-by-registration theory percolated in the
lower courts, in March 2021 it reemerged at the Supreme Court
in an unlikely posture—Justice Neil Gorsuch’s concurrence in
Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court,220 a
specific jurisdiction case. In Ford, the plaintiff died in a crash in
her home state of Montana involving a malfunction in her Ford
Explorer—manufactured and purchased outside Montana—and
a representative of her estate sued Ford in Montana.221 Ford
moved to dismiss the suit for lack of personal jurisdiction;
although Ford advertises and sells the same model vehicle in
Montana, it argued that the suit did not arise out of those
Montana contacts because the vehicle in question was designed
and sold in other states and only entered Montana through
resales and relocations.222 In a unanimous decision, the Court
rejected Ford’s “causation-only approach,”223 finding instead
that there was a sufficiently “strong ‘relationship among the
defendant, the forum, and the litigation’”224 to hold that the suits
relate to Ford’s contacts in Montana.225

218. Id.; see also id. at 4–5 (“So if you treat a corporation like a person,
which we seem to be doing, why isn’t their registration for purposes of
accepting service enough?”).
219. Id. at 5. The Court heard Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court
of California, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017), earlier that same day.
220. 141 S. Ct. 1017 (2021).
221. See id. at 1023.
222. See id. (“According to Ford, the state court . . . had jurisdiction only if
the company’s conduct in the State had given rise to the plaintiff’s claims.”).
223. See id. at 1026 (finding “no support” for the approach “in [the] Court’s
requirement of a ‘connection’ between a plaintiff’s suit and a defendant’s
activities.”) (quoting Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1779).
224. See id. at 1028 (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v.
Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984)).
225. See id. at 1032 (“[T]he connection between the plaintiffs’ claims and
Ford’s activities in those States . . . is close enough to support specific
jurisdiction.”).
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Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence, joined by Justice Thomas,
not only referenced consent by registration as an unsettled
issue,226 but also indicated skepticism of the continuing practical
value of International Shoe.227 On general jurisdiction, Justice
Gorsuch highlighted that, under the “at home” test for
corporations—as compared to the “tag rule” under Burnham v.
Superior Court of California228—”it seems corporations continue
to receive special jurisdictional protections in the name of the
Constitution. Less clear is why.”229 For the courts that rely on
International
Shoe
as
permanently
foreclosing
the
consent-by-registration theory, Justice Gorsuch’s analysis
seemingly casts doubt on their approach.
The consent-by-registration debate is still alive,230 and even
the high court in Pennsylvania—home to the most
plaintiff-friendly registration statute in the country—is now
taking up this issue for the first time since Daimler.231 But even
if consent by registration would, in theory, obviate the
contacts-based Due Process analysis of Daimler, there remains
the question of the validity of the consent itself.

226. See id. at 1037 n.3 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“It is unclear what
remains of the old ‘consent’ theory after International Shoe’s criticism. Some
courts read International Shoe and the cases that follow as effectively
foreclosing it, while others insist it remains viable.”) (citations omitted).
227. See id. at 1038 (“Maybe, too, International Shoe just doesn’t work
quite as well as it once did . . . [t]he real struggle here isn’t with settling on the
right outcome in these cases, but with making sense of our personal
jurisdiction jurisprudence and International Shoe’s increasingly doubtful
dichotomy.”).
228. 495 U.S. 604 (1990) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
229. See Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017,
1038 (2021) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
230. See supra notes 43–45 and accompanying text.
231. See Mallory v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., No. 802 EDA 2018, 2020 WL
6375871 (Pa. Super. Ct. Oct. 30, 2020) (transfer to Pennsylvania Supreme
Court); David R. Fine, David A. Fusco, & Hudson M. Stoner, Pennsylvania
Supreme Court to Consider Whether Business Registration Subjects an
Out-of-State Company to General Personal Jurisdiction, K&L GATES (Jan. 14.
2021), https://perma.cc/R9CS-QQGR (opining that the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court “is poised to address” whether Pennsylvania’s statutory scheme
requiring consent to general personal jurisdiction is constitutional).
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IV. IS CONSENT BY REGISTRATION REALLY CONSENT?
Consent by registration draws scrutiny from a variety of
angles other than that of jurisdictional Due Process. One recent
critique that ought to receive more attention is the idea that a
company’s registration to do business in a state cannot be
deemed valid consent to general jurisdiction in that state.232 The
Honorable Eduardo C. Robreno of the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania offered this justification for refusing to enforce the
Pennsylvania registration statute in In re Asbestos Products
Liability Litigation (No. IV).233 In In re Asbestos, Judge Robreno
declined to follow Bane’s holding that the Pennsylvania
statutory scheme comports with Due Process,234 finding instead
that the consent “extract[ed]” from foreign corporations by the
Pennsylvania statutory scheme “impermissibly re-open[ed] the
door to nation-wide general jurisdiction that Daimler firmly
closed.”235
To uphold consent under any statutory or common-law
scheme, the consent must be informed and voluntary.236 This
Part addresses what seems to be the dispositive question: can
consent by registration ever be considered knowing and
voluntary?
A.

Informed Consent by Registration

To reach the conclusion that a corporation’s registration to
do business can ever suffice as valid consent to general
jurisdiction, it goes nearly without saying that the consent must
be informed. Knowing consent would seemingly require that the
corporation giving the consent to general jurisdiction was on

232. See Monestier, supra note 47, at 1347 (introducing the argument that
“general jurisdiction based on registration to do business violates the Due
Process Clause because such registration does not actually amount to ‘consent’
as that term is understood in personal jurisdiction jurisprudence”).
233. 384 F. Supp. 3d 532 (E.D. Pa. 2019).
234. See Replica Auto Body Panels & Auto Sales Inc. v. inTech Trailers
Inc., 454 F. Supp. 3d 458, 463 (E.D. Pa. 2020) (noting that Judge Robreno
“departed from the consensus in In re Asbestos”).
235. In re Asbestos, 384 F. Supp. 3d at 543.
236. See, e.g., id. at 538 (noting that “consent is only valid if it is given both
knowingly and voluntarily”).
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notice (either actual or constructive)237 of the consequences of
such consent.
This discussion implicates an important concept: consent
need not be perfect to be valid. In Insurance Corp. of Ireland v.
Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee,238 the Supreme Court listed
“a variety of legal arrangements” that had been taken “to
represent express or implied consent to the personal jurisdiction
of the court.”239 Those arrangements included: (1) parties
agreeing in advance to submit to the jurisdiction of a given
court; (2) parties stipulating to jurisdiction; (3) parties agreeing
to arbitrate; (4) parties voluntarily using certain state
procedures; (5) parties waiving jurisdiction through a failure to
timely raise the issue in an answer or responsive pleading; and
(6) parties submitting to a court’s jurisdiction. Despite the
Court’s recognition of each of these arrangements as valid
consent, some of these expressions of consent might,
situationally, be more informed than others. For example, a
party failing to timely raise the issue of personal jurisdiction in
a responsive pleading, although technically giving implied
consent, is in reality effecting an involuntary forfeiture.240 On
the contrary, parties who stipulate to jurisdiction in advance of
a particular lawsuit241 provide a more perfect consent, in that
they are faced with a particular lawsuit and voluntarily submit
to jurisdiction for that suit. Yet both arrangements are
considered valid consent to jurisdiction. Further, the Supreme
Court has established that “what acts of the defendant shall be
237. Before Daimler, the Supreme Court consistently “upheld state
procedures which find constructive consent to the personal jurisdiction of the
state court in the voluntary use of certain state procedures.” Ins. Corp. of Ir.
v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703 (1982); see also
Rockefeller Univ. v. Ligand Pharms. Inc., 581 F. Supp. 2d 461, 466 (S.D.N.Y.
2008) (“In maintaining an active authorization to do business and not taking
steps to surrender it as it has a right to do, defendant was on constructive
notice that New York deems an authorization to do business as consent to
jurisdiction.”).
238. 456 U.S. 694 (1982).
239. Id. at 703.
240. See, e.g., In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 921 F.3d 98, 107
(3d Cir. 2019) (“[E]ven if the [defendants] had not waived their personal
jurisdiction defenses by filing answers or through other conduct consistent
with waiver, they subsequently forfeited the defense by failing to diligently
pursue it in [the forum].”).
241. See, e.g., Petrowski v. Hawkeye-Sec. Ins. Co., 350 U.S. 495 (1956).
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deemed a submission to [a court’s] power is a matter upon which
States may differ.”242
1.

Explicit Notice

How might a corporation first be put on notice of the
jurisdictional consequences of registering to do business in a
particular state? The inquiry would logically begin with the
relevant language in that state’s registration statute. If the
statute were to explicitly set out that registration to do business
constitutes consent to general jurisdiction in the state, the
corporation would undoubtedly be on notice that registration
would constitute consent to general jurisdiction.243
A helpful analogue in this area is the forum selection clause.
A forum selection clause is typically a section of a larger
contractual agreement between two parties—either individuals
or corporations—requiring that the parties expressly agree to
litigate any lawsuit arising out of the contract in a particular,
designated forum.244 Forum selection clauses can be exclusive
(providing that the dispute can only be maintained in the chosen
forum) or permissive (providing that the dispute can be
maintained in the chosen forum).245 A typical exclusive forum
selection clause might set out, for example, that:
Each of the parties hereto irrevocably consents to the
exclusive jurisdiction of the State of Delaware and the
federal district or state courts sitting in the State of
Delaware, in connection with any matter based upon or
242. See Chicago Life Ins. Co. v. Cherry, 244 U.S. 25, 29–30 (1917).
243. Compare, e.g., Gibraltar Factors Corp. v. Slapo, 125 A.2d 309, 309
(N.J. Super. A.D. 1956) (“[I]t is elementary that all persons are conclusively
presumed to know the law of the land, and ignorance thereof excuses no one.”),
with Diab v. British Airways, PLC, No. 20-3744, 2020 WL 6870607 (slip op. at
*6) (E.D. Pa. Nov. 23, 2020) (concluding that the defendant “registered to do
business in Pennsylvania knowing that doing so subjected it to general
personal jurisdiction in Pennsylvania” based on compliance with the
Pennsylvania explicit registration statutory scheme).
244. See John F. Coyle, Interpreting Forum Selection Clauses, 104 IOWA L.
REV. 1791, 1793 (2019) (describing forum selection clauses as “contractual
provisions in which the parties agree to litigate their disputes in a specified
forum” that are “now regularly written into commercial contracts in the
United States”).
245. See id. at 1802 (“A ‘mandatory’ clause contains language of
exclusivity. A ‘permissive’ clause lacks such language.”).
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arising out of this agreement or the matters contemplated
herein, agrees that process may be served upon them in any
manner authorized by the laws of the State of Delaware for
such person and waives and covenants not to assert or plead
any objection which they might otherwise have to such
jurisdiction and such process.246

Execution of an agreement containing a forum selection
clause usually results in waiver of personal jurisdiction
objections to the chosen forum, because consent to the forum
selection clause constitutes consent to jurisdiction in the
selected forum.247 This is so even if the chosen forum is
unrelated to the litigation, because the consent provides the
basis for the jurisdiction, obviating the Due Process analysis of
the relationship between the defendant’s contacts and the
suit.248 With forum selection clauses, the express language in
the agreement providing for jurisdiction in the selected
forum—to which the parties presumably have consented—gives
the parties sufficient notice of the jurisdictional consequences of
making
that
agreement.
With
an
explicit
consent-by-registration statute like that of Pennsylvania, it is
the express language of the statute—with which any foreign
corporation would have to be familiar before registering to do
business in Pennsylvania—that provides the requisite notice of
the jurisdictional consequences of registration.249
Explicit registration statutes and forum selection clauses
bear similarities with respect to the adequacy of notice for

246. See Ruggiero v. FuturaGene, PLC, 948 A.2d 1124, 1130 (Del. Ch.
2008).
247. See Coyle, supra note 244, at 1802 (“When a clause states that a
particular court shall ‘have jurisdiction’ over a suit, for example, the parties
have not waived their right to sue elsewhere. They have merely waived their
right to object to the assertion of personal jurisdiction by the chosen court.”).
248. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 n.14 (1985)
(“[P]arties frequently stipulate in advance to submit their controversies for
resolution within a particular jurisdiction . . . . Where such forum-selection
provisions have been obtained through freely negotiated agreements and are
not unreasonable and unjust . . . their enforcement does not offend due
process.”) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
249. See, e.g., Bane v. Netlink, 925 F.2d 637, 641 (3d Cir. 1991)
(“The . . . statute . . . gave Netlink notice that [it] was subject to personal
jurisdiction in Pennsylvania and thus it should have been ‘reasonably able to
anticipate being haled into court’ in Pennsylvania.”).
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purposes of consent to personal jurisdiction.250 Where is the
succinct difference? Professor Monestier finds it “difficult to
conceive of consent via a forum selection clause or submission in
the same way as ‘consent’ via registration to do business,”251
positing that “a defendant who signs a contract containing a
forum selection clause . . . does so with respect to a particular
dispute involving a particular plaintiff,”252 unlike consent by
registration, which “is not limited to a particular plaintiff and a
particular dispute” and instead “extends to any and all disputes
involving any and all plaintiffs.”253
But forum selection clauses do not necessarily reference a
particular dispute. Rather, they often reference particular
parties (the parties to the agreement) and a category of disputes
(in our example clause,254 “any matter based upon or arising out
of” the agreement).255 A party that assents to a contract with a
forum selection clause might not necessarily know exactly how
broad or narrow a court may interpret the meaning of “based
upon or arising out of” in the future; rather, that determination
would likely be made only upon enforcement of the forum
selection clause.256 But that does not mean the party’s consent
to the forum selection clause was uninformed or given without
knowledge of the jurisdictional consequences. What matters is
that the party is on notice of the nature of the jurisdiction to
which it consents, not necessarily the particular dispute for
which it consents to jurisdiction. Under any other

250. See, e.g., Bors v. Johnson & Johnson, 208 F. Supp. 3d 648, 655 (E.D.
Pa. 2016)
Parties can agree to waive challenges to personal jurisdiction by agreements
in forum selection clauses or, as here, by registering to do business under a
statute which specifically advises the registrant of its consent by
registration. We do not see a distinction between enforcing a forum selection
clause waiving challenges to personal jurisdiction and enforcing a
corporation’s choice to do business in [Pennsylvania].

251. See Monestier, supra note 47, at 1384.
252. Id. at 1383.
253. Id. at 1384.
254. See supra note 246 and accompanying text.
255. See supra note 246 and accompanying text.
256. See, e.g., Clark-Alonso v. Sw. Airlines Co., 440 F. Supp. 3d 1089,
1094–95 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (concluding that plaintiff’s California Invasion of
Privacy Act claim against Southwest did not “aris[e] out of or relat[e] to”
Southwest’s rewards program rules and regulations).
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interpretation, forum selection clauses would be entirely
unworkable; if one party enforced the clause to the disadvantage
of the other party, the latter could simply claim a lack of
informed consent. The same principles should prevail for
consent by registration. If the statutory scheme puts the party
on notice as to the contours of the jurisdiction to which it would
be submitting through registration to do business, that suffices
to create informed consent.
Additionally, the fact that forum selection clauses—unlike
Pennsylvania’s registration statute—call for consent to
jurisdiction in only a certain category of disputes appears to be
more of a general practice inherent in private contracting than
a legal requirement. In her 1988 article on general jurisdiction
later cited by the Goodyear Court, Professor Brilmayer
acknowledged that parties conceivably could provide consent for
“jurisdiction that is general in all respects,257 and that, at least
in theory, “parties could draft an agreement that subjects a
defendant to the forum’s general jurisdiction.”258 Professor
Brilmayer also noted that “analogous consent” exists “when a
foreign corporation appoints an agent for service of process.”259
That said, parties to a private contractual agreement typically
would not have much incentive to negotiate such a broad
jurisdictional clause.260
Another
possible
difference
Professor
Monestier
underscores is that “the nature of the relationships between the
entities involved” in forum selection clauses and a company’s
business registration “differs considerably.”261 With a forum
257. See Brilmayer et al., supra note 87, at 756 (“In other words, [parties]
might agree to jurisdiction for suits that bear no relationship to the instrument
in which they express consent and that have no relationship to the chosen
forum.”).
258. Id.; see also Forest Lab’ys, Inc., v. Amneal Pharms. LLC, No. CV 14508-LPS, 2015 WL 880599, at *14 (D. Del. Feb. 26, 2015) (“[W]hy could a
corporation not agree with a competitor, as part of a settlement agreement in
which it obtained something of value in return, that it would not contest
personal jurisdiction in a state as to any future claims that the competitor later
brings in the state’s courts as to any subject matter?”).
259. Brilmayer et al., supra note 87. But see id. at 757 (“The most
formidable constitutional issue surrounding general jurisdiction by consent
arises when consent derives from a statutorily required appointment rather
than from contract.”).
260. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
261. See Monestier, supra note 47, at 1384.
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selection clause, the relationship forming the basis for the
consent is between the plaintiff and defendant, while the state
remains disinterested.262 With consent by registration, however,
the relationship is between the state and the defendant, and a
third-party plaintiff—having no connection to the defendant
corporation’s prior consent—will benefit from the corporation’s
registration.263
It is unclear, though, how or why this would affect—in
either context—a party’s ability to understand the nature of the
jurisdiction to which it consents, and then to effect the conduct
that constitutes consent. It is true that typically “the notion of a
contract generally implies that it only regulates activity
between the contracting parties.”264 However, the logical bounds
of that proposition are tested where the contract involves
consent to general jurisdiction, which would necessarily benefit
potential plaintiffs not party to the agreement who could obtain
personal jurisdiction over a defendant corporation that was
party to the agreement.265 Moreover, governments might also
benefit from this arrangement if they could then bring civil
actions against that corporation in the selected jurisdiction
based on that agreement. This is all to say that the existence of
a third-party beneficiary to an agreement that requires consent
to general jurisdiction should not make the consent any less
voluntary.
2.

Implicit Notice

If any type of registration statute should put a corporation
on fair notice of the jurisdictional consequences of registering to
do business, it would be one that is jurisdictionally explicit. But
Pennsylvania’s statute is still the only one of its kind in the
United States. As Professor Monestier characterized it, “[i]n the
vast majority of circumstances, a corporation does not know in

262. See id.
263. See id.
264. See Kipp, supra note 151, at 19.
265. See Brilmayer et al., supra note 87, at 756 (explaining that a private
agreement subjecting a party to general jurisdiction “would permit any
individual, even one not a party to the agreement, to sue on any subject matter,
even one with no connection to the forum”).
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advance what it is consenting to in registering to do business”266
because “all but one of the fifty statutory schemes is silent on
the jurisdictional effects of registering to do business.”267 Judge
Robreno surmised the same in In re Asbestos, noting that many
other courts confronting this issue have held that their state
registration statutes do not imply consent to general jurisdiction
“because, inter alia, the language of the statutes are not explicit
in this regard,” and therefore “the purported consent is not
knowingly given.”268
While the text of the statute itself is undoubtedly the first
stop in determining whether the statute requires consent to
general jurisdiction, Judge Robreno’s observation fails to
consider the possibility that a corporation might also be put on
notice by decisional law interpreting the statute that the law
requires consent to general jurisdiction. As the Honorable
Leonard P. Stark of the District of Delaware reasoned in Acorda
Therapeutics v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals,269 “when courts have
clearly held that compliance with a state’s registration statute
confers general jurisdiction, corporations have the requisite
notice to enable them to structure their conduct so as to be
assured where they will, and will not, be subject to suit.”270
In the Eighth Circuit, Knowlton remains good law, and
courts in Iowa and Minnesota, as well as in Kansas and New
Mexico (despite being outside Eighth Circuit territory) have
repeatedly applied Knowlton in interpreting their registration
statutes to require consent to general jurisdiction.271 Some
parties might disagree with its legal predicate,272 but as long as
it remains unaltered by a court of last resort or legislature,
Knowlton—and state supreme court cases following

266. Monestier, supra note 47, at 1387.
267. Id.
268. See In re Asbestos, 384 F. Supp. 3d at 538.
269. 78 F. Supp. 3d. 572 (D. Del. 2015).
270. Id. at 591.
271. See supra notes 184–195 and accompanying text.
272. See, e.g., GreenState Credit Union v. Hy-Vee, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 3d
799, 807 (D. Minn. Nov. 10, 2020) (“Although defendant makes a compelling
argument that Knowlton is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s recent
general jurisdiction decisions, the court agrees with other courts in this district
that it is still bound by Knowlton.”) (allowing interlocutory appeal of
jurisdictional issue).
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Knowlton—provides a binding interpretation of the relevant
registration statute, of which parties choosing to register under
that statute are assumed to be aware.273 Further, parties cannot
impute to the legislature an intent to change well-established
rules of law in the jurisdiction such as that set out in Knowlton,
“in the absence of a clear manifestation of such intention.”274
The idea that a party can give implied consent to personal
jurisdiction in a lawsuit based solely on a rule established
primarily through common law is not new. In the context of
counterclaims, it is well settled. While the Due Process Clause
does provide personal jurisdiction protections to plaintiffs,275 the
plaintiff effectively waives those protections by filing suit in the
chosen forum.276 Typically this causes no issues because,
presumably, the plaintiff would only file in a particular forum if
it actually wanted to litigate the case there. But defendants are
also permitted to assert counterclaims against the original
plaintiff that do not relate to the original plaintiff’s chosen
forum—and the Supreme Court has held that the original
plaintiff’s consent to jurisdiction extends to those claims as
well.277 Some courts have reasoned that plaintiffs, as voluntary
party-claimants, are simply not subject to the protections of
personal jurisdiction.278 In short, when a party files a lawsuit in

273. See Am. Dairy Queen Corp. v. W.B. Mason Co., No. 18-cv-693, 2019
WL 135699, at *6 (D. Minn. Jan. 8, 2019) (“Knowlton has been good law since
1991, alerting any foreign corporation who registers under Minn. Stat. § 303,
that by doing so, they are consenting to general personal jurisdiction in the
forum.”); see also United States v. Bronstein, 849 F.3d 1101, 1107 (D.C. Cir.
2017) (“Citizens are charged with generally knowing the law, and what a law
means is a function of interpreting the statute.”).
274. See Odell v. Humble Oil & Refin. Co., 201 F.2d 123, 126 (10th Cir.
1953) (citing Munson Line v. Green, 6 F.R.D. 14, 19 (S.D.N.Y. 1946)).
275. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
276. Id.
277. See Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59, 67–68 (1938)
The plaintiff having, by his voluntary act in demanding justice from the
defendant, submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court, there is
nothing arbitrary or unreasonable in treating him as being there for all
purposes for which justice to the defendant requires his presence. It is the
price which the state may exact as the condition of opening its courts to the
plaintiff.

278. See Dodson, supra note 80, at 1467 (“A court may lack personal
jurisdiction over a defendant, but never over a plaintiff, who consents to such
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a state, Supreme Court precedent—not explicit statutory
language—deems them to have consented to personal
jurisdiction on unrelated counterclaims filed against them. By
that logic, why, then, could a state not apply its own registration
statute as requiring consent to general jurisdiction if there was
legislative support for that interpretation?
B.

Voluntary Consent by Registration

Even assuming that the corporation is fully aware that the
state—whether
through
explicit
text
or
common
law—interprets its registration statute to require consent to
general jurisdiction in the state, one could argue that the
consent still fails to suffice because it is coerced, and thereby
involuntary.279 According to Professor Monestier:
The notion of consent implies that a party has
alternatives—in particular, the alternative not to consent. In
the context of registration statutes, the idea that a
corporation had the choice to register (and thereby consent
to jurisdiction) suggests that there was also a legitimate
choice to not register (and therefore not consent to
jurisdiction). Aside from registering to do business in the
state and thereby consenting to general jurisdiction, a
corporation really only has one of two choices: not do
business in the state or do business in the state without
registering and face whatever penalties the law ascribes.280

Judge Robreno put it similarly in In re Asbestos: the
Pennsylvania statute “presents a foreign corporation with a
Hobson’s choice: consent to general personal jurisdiction or be
denied the benefits of doing business in Pennsylvania”.281 While
reasonable to a point, these characterizations fail to “distinguish
compulsory agreement from incentive.”282 Every state offers
myriad incentives and deterrents to corporations considering
jurisdiction by filing suit.”) (citing Viron Int’l Corp. v. David Boland, Inc., 237
F. Supp. 2d 812, 818 (W.D. Mich. 2002)).
279. See Monestier, supra note 47, at 1389.
280. See id.
281. See In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig., 384 F. Supp. 3d. 532, 541 (E.D.
Pa. 2019).
282. See Oscar G. Chase, Consent to General Jurisdiction: The Foundation
of “Registration” Statutes, 73 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 159, 182 (2018).
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doing business there, such the tax rate, population, or any
reputation for heavily (or lightly) regulating businesses. The
jurisdictional rules of the state fall under the same umbrella.
Corporations are free to choose from the fifty states and only
register in the states that provide it a business advantage. 283
Likewise, state legislatures have an interest both in making
their jurisdictions an attractive commercial destination and in
providing a forum to their residents and visitors,284 and must
weigh those countervailing priorities when assembling its public
law.
Similarly, while the language in the consent-by-registration
statutes of the fifty states are not exactly up for debate (at least
outside the legislature), courts regularly uphold agreements
that likewise are not the product of free or fair negotiation.285
Consider the example of forum selection clauses. In one of the
Supreme Court’s most significant opinions addressing forum
selection clauses—Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute286—the Court
enforced a forum selection clause that was printed on a cruise
ship ticket which the plaintiff—a passenger who was injured on
the defendant’s cruise—did not even receive until after
purchase.287 The majority acknowledged that,
In this context, it would be entirely unreasonable for us to
assume
that
respondents—or
any
other
cruise
passenger—would negotiate with petitioner the terms of a
forum-selection clause in an ordinary commercial cruise
283. See Diab v. British Airways, PLC, No. 20-3744, 2020 WL 6870607
(slip op. at *5) (E.D. Pa. Nov. 23, 2020) (“[T]he mere fact that a company might
need to face lawsuits in Pennsylvania as a price for doing business in the
Commonwealth presents no great threat to companies.”).
284. See supra notes 208–209 and accompanying text.
285. See id.
[E]ven if Pennsylvania law requires foreign businesses to make a difficult
decision, so what? Individuals regularly face difficult decisions about
waiving important rights, such as the rights counsel, trial, appeal, and
silence in the face of government questioning. Moreover, businesses
regularly extract waivers from individuals, whether demanding that
individuals agree to certain terms merely by clicking on a link or making a
purchase. Individuals can even forfeit the right to sue in court by simply
accepting employment. This Court discerns no problem with Pennsylvania
extracting a concession from a business that voluntarily and knowingly does
business in the Commonwealth.

286.
287.

499 U.S. 585, 587 (1991).
See id. at 593.

104

78 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 55 (2021)
ticket. Common sense dictates that a ticket of this kind will
be a form contract—the terms of which are not subject to
negotiation—and that an individual purchasing the ticket
will not have bargaining parity with the cruise line.288

In terms of the validity of consent, forum selection clauses
and
consent-by-registration
statutes
bear
important
similarities,289 and if Carnival Cruise Lines is any indication of
the threshold level of voluntariness a party must have to find
valid consent to jurisdiction, consent by registration clears this
hurdle with ease.
V. CONCLUSION
Though many jurisdictions have tossed consent by
registration to the wayside as unconstitutional after Daimler,
one could fairly interpret the prevailing Supreme Court
authority as wholly permitting states to require corporations to
consent to general jurisdiction by registering to do business,
provided either that the statute is explicit in providing so, or the
controlling authority is unambiguous in its interpretation of the
statute to the same.290 What this Note does not argue, though,
is that every state court must—or even should—interpret their
state’s silent registration statute to require consent to general
jurisdiction. To the contrary, courts should work through
normal canons of statutory interpretation, applied separately to
each state statute, to resolve whether the statute before them
was written to require such consent.291 Rather, this Note

288. Id. at 595.
289. See supra Part IV.A.
290. See, e.g., Fidrych v. Marriot Int’l, 952 F.3d 124, 137 (4th Cir. 2020)
(noting that under the rules set out in Pennsylvania Fire, “obtaining the
necessary certification to conduct business in a given state amounts to consent
to general jurisdiction in that state only if that condition is explicit in the
statute or the state courts have interpreted the statute as imposing that
condition”).
291. See, e.g., Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. McCall, __ S.E.2d __, 2021 WL
4268074, at *9 (Ga. 2021) (considering, as a matter of statutory stare decisis,
whether to overrule a prior decision of the Georgia Supreme Court that
interpreted the state registration statute as requiring consent to general
jurisdiction); ); Aybar v. Aybar, 2021 NY 54U (2021), https://perma.cc/9B4WRDL6 (concluding as a matter of statutory interpretation that registration to
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suggests that if that process leads to the conclusion that an
otherwise-silent registration statute requires consent to general
jurisdiction, corporations should be held to that construction, at
least until the Supreme Court ever finds it to be inconsistent
with the Constitution.292
That said, given the Court’s apparent reluctance to provide
a definitive answer, there is a simpler solution outside the
judiciary that has largely been ignored: states with silent
registration statutes can—and should—displace their decisional
law by passing modernized language that explicitly addresses
whether or not the statute compels consent to personal
jurisdiction—general or specific.293 Though many appellate
courts as have rejected consent by registration, only a small
minority of state legislatures have adopted, or attempted to
adopt, jurisdictionally explicit statutes.294 Moreover, personal
jurisdiction doctrine has evolved quite significantly since many
of these statutes were adopted or last amended. An update is
certainly warranted.295
This is not to say that every—or even any—state should
pass registration statutes that require that all corporate
registrants to consent to general jurisdiction. A state’s revised
statute could foreclose consent by registration altogether, mirror
Pennsylvania’s
explicit
consent-by-registration
general

do business in New York does not constitute consent to general jurisdiction in
New York courts).
292. See Am. Dairy Queen Corp. v. W.B. Mason Co., No. 18-cv-693, 2019
WL 135699, at *6 (D. Minn. Jan. 8, 2019) (“It is for the Supreme Court to
address consent by registration statutes in light of its new jurisprudence on
general personal jurisdiction and/or for the Eighth Circuit to reconsider
Knowlton in light of this changing view of the law.”).
293. See, e.g., S.B. 7253, 244th Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2021),
https://perma.cc/9FN2-FJWM. But see Letter from New York City Bar
Association to Gov. Kathy Hochul (Aug. 26, 2021).
294. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-20-115 (West 2020) (“The appointment
or maintenance in this state of a registered agent does not by itself create the
basis for personal jurisdiction over the represented entity in this state.”); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 59-11-21 (2020) (“The appointment or maintenance in this
state of a registered agent does not by itself create the basis for personal
jurisdiction over the represented entity in this state.”).
295. See Cooper Tire, __ S.E.2d __, 2021 WL 4268074, at *11 (Bethel, J.,
concurring) (writing separately “for the sole purpose of calling the General
Assembly’s attention to the peculiar and precarious position of the current law
of Georgia”).
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jurisdiction scheme or, as some scholars have suggested, provide
some middle ground that confers sub-general jurisdiction in a
narrow set of circumstances that implicate various state
sovereign interests.296 Any of these legislative changes would
serve clarity and predictability, two crucial ends of the rule of
law. By installing unambiguous jurisdictional language in the
registration statute, state legislatures can make clearer the
consequences of registering to do business—whatever they may
be—in the text itself, without subjecting defendants to “the risk
of the interpretation that may be put upon it by the courts.”297

296. See Rhodes & Robertson, supra note 90, at 381 (proposing a model
statute that would require consent to suit “in defined circumstances that
implicate state sovereign interests,” such as “when the suit arises from an
injury suffered in the state, the suit is brought by a state resident, the suit is
governed by that state’s law, or the suit is to enforce a judgment or remedial
order against persons or property within the state”).
297. Pa. Fire Ins. Co. of Phila. v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243 U.S.
93, 96 (1917).

